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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this court is conferred pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 78-2a-3 (h) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
This action involves the defendant's appeal of certain provisions of 
the Decree of Divorce signed and entered by the Honorable John A. 
Rokich, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County/ Utah, on April 26, 1989. Notice of Appeal was filed on May 
24/ 1989. The plaintiff has not filed a Cross-Appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In dividing the marital estate the trial court can enter such 
orders concerning property distribution and alimony as are 
equitable. Utah Code Ann./ Section 30-3-5 (1987). "In making such 
orders, the trial court is permitted broad latitude, and its 
judgment is not to be lightly disturbed/ so long as it exercises its 
discretion in accordance with the standard set by this Court." 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 276 (Utah 1987); Weston v. Weston, 
107 Utah Adv. Rep. 78, 79. 
"To mount a successful attack on the trial court's factual 
findings, an appellant must marshall all of the evidence in support 
of the trial courtfs findings and then demonstrate that, even 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), cited with approval in 
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Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. Elizabeth, plaintiff/respondent, filed 
a complaint for divorce, for custody of the parties1 three children, 
for child support, alimony, division of the parties1 property, and 
attorney's fees. David, defendant/appellant, filed an Answer and 
subsequent motions, disputing all of the plaintiff's claims and 
alleging that he should be awarded custody of the children. 
Numerous hearings took place before the 5-day trial. The 
defendant continued to press his claims for custody of the children, 
even though neither of the evaluations which had been prepared 
recommended that he should be awarded custody. After the trial, the 
proceedings continued, both in open court and through various 
affidavits and memoranda filed with the court. There was vigorous 
debate over the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree of Divorce, which, after modification, in conformance with 
the orders of the court, were signed and entered on April 26, 1989. 
The Decree of Divorce granted the plaintiff a divorce and 
awarded her custody of the children, alimony, child support, a share 
of the children's day-care expenses, approximately half of the 
marital property, and less than half of her attorney's fees and 
costs. 
Copies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree 
of Divorce are included in the Addendum to this Brief. Also included 
are copies of: (a) the plaintiff's revised Financial Declaration (R. 
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107-110); (b) a letter from the defendant's trial attorney to the 
court, dated February 10, 1989 (R. 132-133); (c) a letter from the 
plaintiff's attorney to the court, dated February 21, 1989 (R. 141); 
(d) defendant's Proposals for Custody Arrangements memorandum, filed 
with the court on March 6, 1989 (R. 149); (e) affidavit for 
plaintiff's attorney's fees( (R. 161-169; (f) defendant's Request 
for Clarification of Minute Entry, Objections, etc* filed with the 
court on April 18, 1989, (R. 194-220); (g) defendant's Motion to 
Stay (R. 329-330); (h) plaintiff's Notice of Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment and Property Transfer (R. 336); (i) and, plaintiff's Notice 
in re Judgment on Merrill Lynch Accounts). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on May 24, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Marital History. 
The parties met while attending the Southwestern Baptist 
Seminary. They married in Jackson, Mississippi, on June 27, 1981. 
From the very beginning of the marriage, David subjected Elizabeth 
to mental and physical abuse (Tr. 7,8). He demanded total submission 
(Tr. 16). Approximately two years before she filed for divorce, 
following a particularly violent confrontation, Elizabeth realized 
that she could not endure the abuse any more and became more 
assertive. This served to increase David's anger at her refusal to 
be a subr;iTsive wife (Tr. 14,15). 
Elizabeth testified that before she realized the necessity of 
becoming more assertive in dealing with David. "...I felt like I was 
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pleasing the Lord by being submissive to my husband to the sacrifice 
of myself, I suppose. I tried in every way to please him, in my 
cooking, staying at home, not working, having the children when he 
wanted than, having the number of children he wanted (Tr. 15,16)." 
Elizabeth wanted to wait at least a little while after the 
marriage to begin having children, but gave in to David's wishes and 
started having children right after the marriage (Tr. 16). 
Similarly, because David wanted her to stay in the home, and not to 
take a job, she did not pursue a career (Tr. 16). Before the 
separation, her only work outside the home was in a preschool, where 
she worked only a few hours a week for about a year. This was before 
the parties moved to Salt Lake City (Tr. 46). 
Elizabeth obtained an undergraduate degree in business and 44 
hours of seminary credit before the marriage. After the marriage, 
she did not complete her education. David, on the other hand, went 
on to complete the four and one-half years of his seminary training. 
During the last year, he was a full-time student and the parties 
lived off their savings in the Ready Asset Account (Tr. 54). 
After moving to Salt Lake City, in August, 1985, David and 
Elizabeth started a mission church in their home. Each month, 
David's parents contributed $150.00 and Elizabeth's parents 
contributed $350.00 toward the combined church and household 
expenses (Tr. 52). (The mission church was not a success, and had 
closed some time before Elizabeth filed for divorce.) 
Shortly after moving to Salt Lake City, David got a job 
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driving buses for the Granite School District. This is a suntner job 
only: 9-months a year, 6 hours a day, 5 days a week. He also got a 
position as a part-time chaplain at the Utah State Prison. There is 
no indication that he ever attempted to obtain a full-time job as a 
bus driver, as a minister, or anything else. 
After the separation, Elizabeth held two jobs, temporarily. At 
the time of the trial she was unemployed. Before the final hearing, 
she had obtained a job as a full-time receptionist for a law firm. 
At the time of the trial, David was 36 years old, Elizabeth 
was 28 years old, and their children were 3, 4, and 6 years old. 
David had apparently never contemplated a divorce, as he has 
religious convictions forbidding the same (Tr. 781). 
B. Education of the Parties -
Elizabeth: She earned an undergraduate degree in business and 
44 hours of seminary credit before the marriage. 
David: He has an undergraduate degree in business and a 
Master of Divinity degree from Southwestern Theological Seminary 
(Tr. 53). David spent a total of 7.5 years preparing for the 
ministry (Tr. 709). 
C. Employment History and Income Potential. 
Elizabeth: She did not work outside the home because David 
insisted that she be a full-time housewife. Her only employment 
outside the home before the separation was as a part-time preschool 
teacher in San Antonio, Texas, where she worked about 10 hours a 
week for approximately a year (Tr. 46). 
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After the separation, Elizabeth worked first in telephone 
sales for a few months and afterwards in retail sales for $4.10 an 
hour on a part-time basis (Tr. 47, 48). At the time of the trial, 
Elizabeth testified that she anticipated that with her present 
office skills she could earn $800.00 to $1,000.00 a month, working 
full time (Tr. 50). This prediction proved correct. At the time of 
the final hearing, she was employed as a receptionist for a law 
firm, earning $6.00 an hour, or $960.00 a month, (R. 141). 
David: David was still employed as a part-time bus driver and 
chaplain at the time of trial. As a bus driver, David works only 6 
hours a day (6:30-9:00 a.m., 2:00-5:00 p.m.), 5 days a week or 30 
hours a week. He works at this job only 9 months a year (Tr. 733). 
He is paid on a 12 month contract, even though he works only 9 
months a year (Tr. 697). His income from this job prorated over 12 
months, is $860.00 a month, gross. When calculated on a 9-month 
basis, it is $1,146.67 a month. 
David testified that every two weeks he is paid for 39 hours 
of service as a chaplain at the Utah State Prison. He is not 
required to maintain any particular schedule. It is not necessary 
for him to provide Sunday services to the inmates. He doesn't have 
to work 39 hours. He can use other ministers or volunteers to fill 
in his hours. His income from this employment, which is year-round, 
is $700.00 a month (Tr. 614). The income earned at the Prison is tax 
exempt, as income earned by clergy (Tr. 728). 
In addition, he receives $166.00 a month as a director's fee 
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froti his father's business (Tr. 614). There is no evidence that he 
has to do any work for this money. 
During the summers, David works only at the Prison, vrfiere his 
commitment, whether in his own time or that of volunteers, is only 
19.5 hours a week. 
David advised the trial court that he could earn an extra 
$2,000.00 each summer (Tr. 863, R. 132-133). He also testified that 
he could apply for additional bus-driving work, up to 10 hours more 
a week during the school year (Tr. 732). 
The trial court observed, after hearing all of the evidence 
and the final arguments of the parties, that it was imperative for 
both of the parties to seek additional employment (at that time 
Elizabeth did not have a job) (Tr. 850). He ordered the parties to 
inform him of any change in their employment status (Tr. 851). In 
response to that order, Elizabeth subsequently informed the court 
that she had obtained a full-time job and was earning $960.00 a 
month. (R. 141). 
At a hearing scheduled to discuss the proposed Findings of 
Fact, when David's trial attorney protested the award of alimony, 
the trial court stated that "he [David] ought to go out and get a 
job" (Tr. 868). And again, "He [David] says he has all that time to 
spend with the kids. He better take that time and go work somewhere 
else" (Tr. 869). 
D. Income and Expenses* 
Elizabeth: As of the final hearing, Elizabeth's income was 
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$960.00 a month. This was the income considered by the trial court 
in determining alimony and child support (R. 141). 
Elizabeth testified that her current expenses, for herself and 
the children, were about $2,100.00 a month (Tr. 63). She had new 
expenses, for which the parties had had no obligation before their 
separation. 
For example, after the separation, the children began going 
full-time to a Montessori School, which costs $450.00 a month (Tr. 
43, 689). David agrees that the children should attend this school 
(Tr* 689). After the separation, Elizabeth had to buy the children's 
clothes, whereas previously the paternal grandparents had born most 
of this expense (Tr. 373). In addition, after the separation, 
Elizabeth had expenses for maintaining the house and yard, for work 
that David used to do. David testified that when the parties lived 
together he did all of the household repairs and yard work (Tr. 706, 
707). David insisted that Elizabeth's expenses for maintaining the 
house and yard would be equal to the house payment (Tr. 844). 
The trial court limited Elizabeth's evidence on her expenses, 
stating that he had plenty of information on the living expenses and 
income of the parties to enter orders on child support and alimony 
(Tr. 738). 
David: David has other income, in addition to his income 
earned as a part-time bus driver and part-time employee of the 
Prison. As mentioned above, he is given a director's fee each year 
by his father's business. He continues to receive substantial 
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financial assistance from his parents* 
This became evident during the trial* David spent at least 
$3,525.00 on costs alone — in addition to his attorney's fees of at 
least $11/303.50 (R. 170-174). He even had sufficient funds to pay 
the expenses of out-of-town witnesses, including Kurt Eshelman's 
hotel rocm (Tr. 277), and Pat Lynch1s airfare, rental-car charges, 
and hotel room (Tr. 341-342). 
David's trial attorney informed the trial court that David 
could cone up with $5,000.00 or more, whatever the court thought was 
fair, to buy out Elizabeth's share of the Blazer (Tr. 829). And, as 
a matter of fact, after the trial David took the Blazer from 
Elizabeth and gave her a check for $6,500.00 (R. 336). 
David seemed to have plenty of money available before the 
trial. He testified that he had been paying: 
(a) The house payment $354.00 
(b) Child support 300.00 
(c) Hot lunches for the children 
at their school 60.00 
(c) Tithing 141.00 
(d) His own living expenses 1,060.00 
TOTAL: $1,855.00 
(Tr. 619, 620, 759). 
David testified that he had borrowed money from his father to 
meet expenses (Tr. 762). But the court sustained an objection to the 
question as to whether he had borrowed $22,000.00 that year (Tr. 
762, 763). There is no evidence that David felt obliged to repay his 
father. His financial declaration does not list any loans from his 
father (Ex. 18-D). 
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David's father testified that during the marriage he had sent 
money to the parties on a regular basis but didn't know what they 
did with it (Tr. 380). His mother testified that they sent $300.00 
at least once or twice a year for the children's clothes, before the 
separation. Neither of these witnesses testified that they expected 
repayment of any sum of money paid to the parties or to David alone. 
Although David testified that his living expenses were 
$1,201.00 (including tithing) — which he believed to be reasonable 
— he insisted that the living expenses for the entire family before 
the separation were between $1,000.00 and $1,200.00 a month. (Tr. 
620, 642). 
E. Cash Assets * 
David's Pre-Marital Holdings: It is undisputed that before the 
parties married, David had $37,500.00 in a Merrill Lynch Ready Asset 
Account. He had received this fund as a gift from his family. 
Cash wedding gift: The parties received a check for $8,000.00 
from David's parents as a wedding gift. David testified, "My father 
gave us a substantial cash gift.... He gave us an option of a car or 
$8,000.00 and we chose the $8,000.00 because I was buying a car 
from Liz's father (Tr. 755)." The parties agreed to use $5,000.00 
from the $8,000.00 check for tithing (Tr. 761). David explained that 
this was a tithe of about 10 percent not only on the wedding gift, 
but also on the money he had in the Ready Asset Account and also on 
income that he had earned (Tr. 763). The remaining $3,000.00 went 
into the Ready Asset Account (Tr. 762). 
-10-
Withdrawals from the account: During the marriage/ the parties 
used funds from the Ready Asset Account for marital purposes: To set 
up a retirenent account/ and to pay living expenses. 
David testified that $10,000.00 was taken from the account for 
use as IRA payments (Tr. 742). David's intention as to create a 
retirenent account and to gain a tax advantage (Tr. 632, 727). The 
IRA account was the only retirement account opened during the 
marriage except for a small account with Granite School District of 
less than $200.00, which was awarded to David (Tr. 618, 742). 
Elizabeth testified that David never made enough money to 
support the family without assistance from his parents (Tr. 53) and 
that they lived off the Ready Asset Account while he finished the 
last year of his education (Tr. 54). 
Of the $40,500.00 balance in the Ready Asset Account as of the 
date of the marriage, less than $2,000.00 remained at the time of 
trial. Since only $10,000.00 had been used for IRA payments, it is 
clear that the parties used over $28,500.00 from this account for 
living expenses during their marriage. This helps to explain why 
David did not feel it necessary to seek better employment (Tr. 59). 
Determination of value to be divided: The trial court ordered 
David to provide supplemental information to determine the value of 
the accounts as of the date of trial. That information was produced 
and filed with the court below, showing the value of the Ready Asset 
Account to have been $2,043.92 and that of the IRA Account to have 
been $17,905.12 (R. 339-342). 
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F. The Marital Residence-
Elizabeth and David purchased their marital residence in 
December, 1985. Title was always held in the names of both parties. 
The parties used a gift of $20,000.00 from David's parents to buy 
this house. In addition, David obtained a no-interest loan of 
$7,000.00 from his parents to use toward the down-payment. The 
balance due on the house was financed and the parties made payments 
thereon with marital funds. 
Elizabeth testified that it had always been her understanding 
that the gift was to the entire family (Tr. 769). At the time of the 
gift, the parties had been married for over four years, all three of 
their children had been born, and no divorce or separation was 
pending. 
David testified that the gift had been intended as a living 
inheritance to him, to help avoid inheritance taxes. But David also 
testified that the $20,000.00 was a gift. (Tr. 712, 713). David 
acknowledged problems in characterizing his parents' contribution 
He told the court, "I'd just as soon the court decide. I have — 
just have to assume that it's your decision, how much the marital 
property was in the home for a couple years and how much would be 
marital property. I would leave that to your discretion (Tr. 712)." 
No documentation for either of his parents' contributions was 
produced by David. There is no evidence that the loan is secured. 
There is no evidence of a lien or mortgage or note for the loan. 
There is no evidence of any writing binding the parties to any 
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obligation. There is no writing setting forth the terms of the 
loan* 
It is of considerable interest that although both of David's 
parents, residents of Palm City, Florida, came to the trial and 
testified in his behalf, neither of then had a single word to say 
about any gift or loan ever made by then to David and Elizabeth 
during their marriage. 
It is obvious that Elizabeth contributed to the maintenance 
and upkeep of the house through her efforts as housewife and mother 
of the parties' children. 
G. The Blazer. 
In 1987 the parties purchased a Blazer automobile for 
$21,166.29 (Tr. 626). The parties traded in their 1982 Buick Regal 
station wagon for $3,635.36 as part of the down-payment. This 
vehicle had been given to the parties after the birth of their third 
child (Tr. 626). An additional $500.00 was appplied toward the down 
payment with funds from the parties' checking account (Tr. 628). In 
addition, $13,500.00 received from David's parents was used toward 
purchase of the Blazer. The remaining balance was financed, with 
payments of $99.00 a month, which were assumed by the plaintiff 
after the separation (R. 85). 
Elizabeth testified that she thought the vehicle was being 
purchased for her and the children, because David had his truck. She 
testified that David told her that his father wanted to buy the 
parties a car or to give then money to buy a car. She selected the 
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car, taking the children's needs into account, and making her 
decision largely on that basis (Tr. 769). 
David's trial attorney, in the course of arguing that David 
should be awarded the Blazer, stated that David would and could pay 
Elizabeth $5,000.00 or more for her interest in the Blazer, whatever 
amount the trial court thought was fair (Tr. 829). 
After the trial, on May 12, 1989, David took the Blazer from 
Elizabeth without her permission and gave her a check for $6,500.00 
(Re 336). The Notice to Stay Proceedings was not filed until May 31, 
1989 (R. 329-330) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING THE PLAINTIFF HALF CF THE MARITAL ESTATE 
The trial court found that all of the property held by the 
parties at the time of the marriage was marital property and awarded 
each party approximately half of the marital estate (R.255-259). 
This was fair and equitable, taking into account all of the facts of 
the case and the circumstances of the parties. 
Elizabeth was awarded custody of the parties1 three young 
children. She and the children obviously need decent housing, 
transportation, and a modicum of fiancial security. In recognition 
of these needs, the court awarded Elizabeth the house, subject to a 
lien for half of the equity in favor of David. The court awarded the 
family car to David, but ordered him to pay Elizabeth $6,500.00 for 
use toward the purchase of a car. Elizabeth was also awarded half of 
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the family savings and retirement accounts. 
In this manner, the judge sought to implorient the proper 
purpose of property division by the trial courts To meet the needs 
of the parties and to allow them to pursue their separate lives. 
Noble v. Noble/ 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah App. 1989). 
Further/ the property was fairly divided between the parties, 
given their contributions during the marriage. Elizabeth, as a 
full-time housewife and the mother of three children born during the 
marriage/ clearly participated in the joint economic efforts of the 
family. Preston vs. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982). 
The trial judge exercised his discretion well within 
applicable standards. The Decree of Divorce was fashioned to meet 
the particular needs and circumstances of Elizabeth and David and 
their children. As Justice Zimmerman expressed it, "The overriding 
consideration is that the ultimate decision be equitable — that 
property be fairly divided between the parties given their 
contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the 
time of the divorce." Newmeyer v. Newneyer, 747 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1987). As expressed by Justice Zinmerman in his concurring 
opinion in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 310 (Utah 1988), 
the general principles of equitable distribution remain unchanged by 
recent guidelines pertaining to the award of inherited and gifted 
property upon divorce. 
Appellant claims that the "law in Utah is now clear that 
pre-marital property and/or its proceeds should be awarded to the 
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party who brought the property into the marriage, citing Preston vs. 
Preston, 646 P„2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 Pc2d 
44 (Utah 1981); Humphrey v. Humphrey, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974); and 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). (Appellant's 
Brief, 22c) On this premise, appellant argues that the court ignored 
the law in dividing the property and "incorrectly analyzed the 
parties1 economic situation and concluded that since the parties had 
acquired very little by way of marital assets, the best thing to do 
was to divide David's separate, pre-marital, gifted, property 
equally" (Appelllant's Brief, 24). 
The appellant's argument fails on two counts: (1) the property 
in question was marital property, and (2) the trial judge did not 
ignore the law or otherwise abuse his discretion. 
First, before awarding the property to the parties, the trial 
judge had found, as a matter of fact, that all of the property owned 
by the parties at the time of their divorce was marital property — 
not separate, pre-marital and gifted property (R. 255-259). The 
trial court's findings of fact on this critical point cannot so 
lightly be ignored or set aside. This Court should not be asked to 
substitute its judgment on factual issues for that of the trial 
judge, who had an opportunity to listen to the witnesses, to observe 
their demeanor, and to consider the testimony and the arguments of 
the parties over a period of several months. 
The trial court's findings of fact should not be overturned 
absent a demonstration by the appellant that the evidence supporting 
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The trial court's findings of fact should not be overturned 
absent a demonstration by the appellant that the evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings "is so lacking as to warrant the 
conclusion that clear error has been committed" Newmeyer, supra, at 
1278-1279. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous/ and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
52(a). The appellant has not met this burden. 
In his discussion of Mortensen, supra, the appellant appears 
to be masking an argument of fact as an argument of law. He cites 
Mortensen only for the general principle that "in general the real 
and personal property brought into a marriage or inherited during a 
marriage should be awarded to the donee upon divorce (Appellant's 
Brief, 22). He does not discuss the exceptions to this general 
guideline, as delineated by Justice Howe, and he does not discuss 
the very useful concurring opinion of Justice Zinmerman, including 
this statement: 
The overarching general rule remains 
the same in any divorce case: to provide 
adequate support for the children of the 
marriage [citation], and to divide the economic 
assets and income stream of the parties so as to 
permit both to maintain themselves after the 
marriage as nearly as possible at the standard 
of living enjoyed during the marriage. 
[Citation.] Id., at 310. 
In Mortensen, Justice Howe relies on Preston, Georgedes, 
Humphrey, and Jesperson , supra, holding that pre-marital or 
inherited property had been or should be awarded to the person who 
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brought it into the marriage. These cases, cited by the appellant 
in support of his position, are in fact distinguishable on the facts 
from the case under consideration. 
For example, all of these cases involve second marriages, into 
which the parties had brought property salvaged from earlier 
divorces. More important, in not one of these cases had any 
children been born as issue of the parties. Only the interests of 
adults were at stake. In Preston, Georgedes, and Humphrey, 
substantial assets were available for distribution at the time of 
the divorce, and, generally speaking, the overall financial 
situation of the parties was far superior to tthat of David and 
Elizabeth. In Jesperson, the parties were 68 and 73 years old at the 
time of the divorce. They had been married only a few years, and the 
only property in dispute was a mobile home which had belonged to the 
wife before the marriage, the award of which to the wife was upheld 
on appeal. 
Finally, in not one of these cases had the trial court found 
—* as it did in the divorce of David and Elizabeth — that the 
property in dispute was all marital property. 
In the case now under appeal, even if the trial judge had not 
found all of the property to be part of the marital estate, the 
award to Elizabeth could withstand attack. As discussed in Peterson 
v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, Section 30-3-5(1) of the Utah Cede Ann. 
is construed to mean that not only may the parties1 pre-marital 
property be subject to division by the court, but also, in making 
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the division of property, the court can take into account all of the 
circumstances of the parties, including the funds available for 
support of the family. In this case, those funds are limited* 
The record is very clear that the trial judge carefully 
considered all of the facts and arguments concerning the parties1 
property. David's arguments concerning the property were submitted 
to the trial court not only during the course of the trial, at final 
argument, and during argument on defendant's objections to the 
proposed Findings of Fact, but also in correspondence and in a 
lengthy memorandum filed with the court after the trial (R. 
149-160). 
POINT II 
DAVID SBOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CLAIM ANY ADDITIONAL AWARD 
FOR HIS PARENTS1 GIFT FOR THE BLAZER BECAUSE HE HAS TAKEN 
SAID VEHICLE FROM ELIZABEIH, AGAINST HER WILL AND CCMBRARY 
TO THE STAY OF EXECUTION, AND HAS PAID HER $6,500.00 FOR 
SAID VEHICLE, AS ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
David now claims that he is entitled to an additional 
$13,500.00 from the marital estate because of his parents1 gift for 
the purchase of an automobile. 
During the trial, David expressed his willingness to pay 
Elizabeth whatever the court thought was fair for her interest in 
the Blazer (Tr. 829). The trial court awarded David the Blazer and 
ordered him to pay Elizabeth $6/500.00. This order was stayed upon 
notice of this appeal (R. 329-330). Nevertheless, David took the 
Blazer from Elizabeth, without her permission, and gave her a check 
for $6,500.00. The judgment has been satisfied (R. 338). Having thus 
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elected to benefit himself in this manner, David should not be 
allowed to object to the trial court's ruling on the Blazerc 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INCLUDING SPECIFIC GIFTS MADE 
BY THE DEFENDANT'S PARENTS AS PART OF THE MARTEVL ESTATE 
A. The Trial Judge Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Awarding 
Plaintiff $6,500.00 for Her Interest in the Blazer and to Assist 
Her in Buying a^  New Car. 
The trial court awarded the Blazer to David and ordered him to 
pay $6,500.00 to Elizabeth, as her share of the equity in the Blazer 
and to assist her in buying a new car. 
The parties received $13,500.00 as a gift from David's 
parents, for a down-payment on a family automobile. Elizabeth 
testified that the Blazer was purchased primarily for her use and 
the children. David had told her that his father wanted to buy the 
parties a car or to give then money to buy a car (Tr. 769). 
The Blazer was purchased for $21,166.29. The parties traded in 
their 1982 Buick Regal station wagon for $3,635.36 as part of the 
down-payment. The parties used $500.00 from their checking account 
toward the down-payment (Tr. 626-628). The balance was financed. The 
parties made payments of $99.00 a month from marital income. After 
the separation, Elizabeth continued to have the use of the Blazer 
and made the payments on it (R. 85). 
At trial, David insisted that he should be awarded the Blazer. 
However, he acknowledged that Elizabeth was entitled to half of the 
equity. He offered to pay her $5,000.00 or whatever larger sum the 
court might order for that interest (Tr. 829). Later, in a 
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memorandum filed before the judge issued his Memorandum Decision, 
David urged the court to award the Blazer to him, stating that he 
would pay Elizabeth whatever sum the court decided would be just, so 
that Elizabeth could purchase a replacement vehicle (R. 159)e In 
thus seeking to persuade the court to award the Blazer to him — in 
which he was successful — David did not ask for any consideration 
for his parents' contribution toward purchase of this vehicle. 
This acknowledgment was appropriate. The Blazer was a marital 
asset. The gift used toward its purchase had been commingled with 
other marital property (Tr. 626, 628). The Blazer (and thus all 
contributions toward its purchase) had depreciated in value. 
Therefore, David should not be credited with the value of the gift 
or any percentage thereof. Mortenson, supra, at 308. 
B. The Trial Judge Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Equally Dividing 
the Equity in the Marital Residence: 
The parties stipulated that whoever was awarded custody of the 
children should be given the use of the house. Elizabeth was awarded 
custody of the children. The house was awarded to her, subject to a 
lien in favor of David for half of the equity. 
Elizabeth testified that David's parents gave $20,000.00 to 
both parties, so that they could buy a home (Tr. 769). David stated 
that the gift was to him alone (Tr. 712,713). David's parents, 
though called to testify, said nothing about the gift. 
David acknowledged Elizabeth's full ownership in the 
house by allowing or directing that her name be on the title 
thereto. Title to the house is in the names of both parties. If, 
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arguendo, the $20,000.00 gift had been made only to David, by 
placing her name on the deed he gave her an interest in the 
property, thus bringing this issue with the exceptions set forth in 
Mortensen, supra, at 308. Even if Elizabeth's name had not been on 
the title, she would have acquired an equitable interest, by virtue 
of her contribution to its maintenance and upkeep. 
During the trial, David indicated to the court that he would 
accept the court's decision as to the extent that the house equity 
was treated as marital property (Tr. 712). 
After the trial, in a long memorandum filed on his behalf, 
David urged that the house be awarded to him (R. 157). He 
acknowledged that the parties had few assets and that this had a 
bearing on how the property was to be divided (R. 157). He stated 
that if the house was awarded to Elizabeth, she should be ordered to 
assume the mortgage and to pay off the $7,000.00 alleged loan to his 
parents, and that he should be awarded a lien "in a reasonable 
amount to be determined by the court11 (R. 158). David argued that 
Elizabeth should be allowed to stay in the house for two or three 
years, "subject to her assuming the mortgage and upkeep of he home," 
after which the house should be sold and "the equity divided" (R. 
158). In a letter mailed to the court after the trial, David urged 
that the house be awarded to him and that Elizabeth should be 
awarded a lien of $10,000,00, which he would pay within five years 
(R. 132-133). 
Concerning the $7,000.00 received from David's parents, the 
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Findings of Fact adopted by the trial court state, in pertinent 
parts 
30 In addition, the defen-
dant's parents loaned $7,000.00 , with no 
interest and with no required payments thereon, 
to the defendant to assist in puchasing this 
property. This loan is not secured and is not 
evidenced in writing and is not enforceable 
against the parties (R. 256). 
This is consistent with the testimony of the parties. Davidfs 
parents did not testify on this issue. There is no evidence of any 
agreement for repayment with Elizabeth. There is no evidence that 
she ever agreed to answer for David's obligation, which, in any 
event, could not be binding on her now, absent a writing subscribed 
by the plaintiff. Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-4 (2), Utah Code 
Ann. There was no abuse of discretion is awarding the house to 
Elizabeth without a requirement that she pay David fs loan to his 
parents. 
David's parents have no ownership interest in the house. At 
the most, they are creditors. The determination of their rights was 
not at issue before the court, and imposed no limitations on the 
discretion of the trial judge in making his award. In Smith v. 
Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988), the wife was awarded a car, 
a mobile home, and other assets which had been purchased by the 
husband's parents, or for which his parents had loaned the parties 
money, with a promise to repay. On appeal it was held that the 
interests of the husband's parents were those of creditors only, and 
that there was no abuse of discretion in the award. ^ Id., at 1151. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION CR OTHERWISE ERR IN NOT 
AWARDING THE DEFENDANT HIS ALLEGED REMNANT OF PREMWOTAL PROPERTY 
Ac The Trial Judge Did Not Abuse His Discretion, as the Partiesf 
Pre-Marital and Marital Assets Have Been OariTiingled. 
This court has held that the trial court's findings will not 
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous or it is clear that a 
mistake has been made. Johnson v. Johnson/ 103 Utah Adv. Rep 22, 23 
(Utah App. 1989). The trial court adopted a number of specific 
findings concerning those assets of the parties in which David's 
pre-marital estate had been commingled. The proposed Findings of 
Fact were subjected to rigorous review upon hearing of the 
defendant's objections/ in support of which he had filed a 27-page 
memorandum (R. 194-224). After this hearing, the court adopted the 
proposed Findings of Fact, as amended pursuant to order of the 
court, including the following: 
29. The marital estate consists of the 
following: 
(f) Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account 
#56623210, the balance of which, according to 
the defendant's Financial Declaration was 
$1,944.59 on September 7, 1989, and the present 
value of which is unknown; 
(g) Merrill Lynch I.R.A. Account 
#566-46206, the balance of which, according to 
the defendant's Financial Declaration, was 
$13,945.00 on January 1, 1989, and the present 
value of which is unknown; (R. 255, 256) 
37. Shortly before the parties' marriage, 
the defendant sold real property which he had 
previously received as a gift from his parents 
and deposited the proceeds of sale, $37,000.00, 
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in the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account. (R. 
257) 
38. The parties received a wedding gift 
from the defendant's parents in the amount of 
$8,000.00. From this sum, tithing was paid in 
the amount of $5,000.00 for gifts received frcm 
defendant's parents (including that referred to 
in the preceding paragraph), and deposited the 
remainder in the Merrill Lynch Ready Asset 
Account. As described in this paragraph, the 
gift of $37,500.00 and the wedding gift of 
$8,000.00 were commingled. (R. 11) 
39. The parties used funds from said 
account to meet their living expenses. In 
addition, $10,000.00 was withdrawn from said 
account and deposited in a Merrill Lynch I.R.A. 
account, the parties' only retirement account. 
(R. 12) 
40. In order to determine the value of the 
Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account and the 
Merrill Lynch I.R.A. Account as of the date the 
Decree of Divorce is entered, it will be 
necessary for the defendant to produce 
documentary verification of said values as of 
the date of entry. Said documentation should be 
provided to counsel for the plaintiff within 30 
days of the date of entry of the Decree. (R. 
258) 
41. The Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account 
and the Merrill Lynch I.R.A. accounts are both 
marital assets and it is reasonable, just and 
equitable that their value should be divided 
equally between the parties. The defendant 
should be awarded both of these accounts and he 
should be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as her 
share of said accounts, half of the value of 
said accounts as shown on the books of Merrill 
Lynch as of the date of entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, for which sum the plaintiff should be 
given judgment. (R. 258) 
These Findings of Fact are amply supported by the record. 
Frcm the very beginning of their marriage, the parties commingled 
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their marital assets and their pre-marital assets. David had 
$37,500.00 in a Ready Asset Account before the marriage. The parties 
received a cash gift of $8,000.00 as a wedding gift (Tr. 755). They 
did not open a special account for this gift. Instead, they agreed 
to take $5,000.00 from the gift to pay a a tithe on both the Ready 
Asset Account and the gift (Tr. 761, 763). In this manner, the 
parties demonstrated that they made no distinction between the money 
in the Ready Asset Account and the money they received as a wedding 
gift. Because the funds have been commingled, the so-called 
Mortensen rule invoked by the appellant does not apply. 
If it had been David's intent to keep his pre-marital funds 
separate, he would have opened a new account for the wedding gift, 
and he would not have depleted that gift by using it to pay his 
personal tithing obligations. 
In Mortensen, Justice Howe concluded that trial courts should 
generally give to a divorcing spouse the gift or inheritance he or 
she acquired during the marriage unless "(1) the other spouse has by 
his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an 
equitable interest in it, [citation], or (2) the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through conmingling or exchanges or 
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of therein to the other 
spouse, ^ d, at 308. 
Throughout their marriage, the parties continued to use the 
Ready Asset Account as a family resource. During David's last year 
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of study at the theological seminary, he chose not to hold down a 
job and the parties lived off this account (Tr. 54). During their 
marriage they continued to draw on the account to meet their living 
expenses. It is estimated that they used approximately $28,500.00 
from the fund for such expenses. 
In addition, the account was used for the family purpose of 
establishing a retirement account. David testified that he withdrew 
about $10,000.00 from the Ready Asset Account to make IRA payments 
(Tr. 742). He testified that this was the parties1 only retirement 
account (Tr. 618). He clearly intended to change the character of 
the funds withdrawn from the Ready Asset Account. Otherwise he would 
not have made the transfers. In addition, it is clear that the 
transfers were made to achieve a tax advantage for the family, 
resulting in increased cash-flow for the use of the parties (Tr. 
632, 727). 
The fact that IRA account is in David's name only does not 
establish that Elizabeth has no claim to a share of it. To the 
contrary, the presumption arises that the account was opened to 
benefit both parties. This is especially so because David does not 
believe in divorce and there is no evidence to suggest that he ever 
anticipated that Elizabeth would leave him. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the IRA account was set up to provide 
support for both parties after David's retirement. This is 
consistent with David's conservative definition of family values. 
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B. The Trial Court's Award to Elizabeth of Half the Value of the 
Ready Asset and the IRA Account Is Equitable Even Without a 
Finding that Funds Had Been Commingled. 
The trial court awarded David both of these accounts and gave 
Elizabeth judgment for half of their value as of the date of the 
divorcee The judgment amount is $9,997.52. (This is significantly 
less than David's $13,900.00 lien on the house, which opens 
possibilities for satisfying the judgment.) 
Even without a finding that the funds had been cotmiingled, on 
the basis of all of the facts of this case, including the origin and 
use of the Ready Asset and IRA Accounts, the cash contributions of 
both sets of the parties' parents, David's underemployment, 
Elizabeth's limited employment prospects, the needs of the 
children, and the limited resources of the parties, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by awarding Elizabeth judgment for half 
of the value of the Ready Asset and IRA Accounts. 
The trial record clearly establishes that this was not the 
usual case in which the Mortensen guidelines could be rigorously 
applied without consideration of all of the circumstances. David had 
never supported his family without help from his parents (Tr. 52, 
380, 762). At an earlier time, the parties also received assistance 
from Elizabeth's parents (Tr. 52). Even so, David has elected to 
wDrk only part time. During the summer he works, at most, only 19.5 
hours a week (R. 614). As a result of David's election not to make 
an adequate living for the family, he has limited the assets of the 
parties. 
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C. Elizabeth is Entitled to Half of the IRA Account as Her Share of 
the Parties' Retirement Fund. 
In a chain of cases, beginning with Wbodward v. Woodward, 656 
Po2d. 431 (Utah 1982), the courts of this state have established 
that the interest in a retiranent plan accrued during marriage is a 
marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. In a 
very recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals has reaffirmed the 
general rule that whenever possible distribution of this asset 
should be made at the time of the divorce and should be deferred 
only in rare instances. Motes v. Motes, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
Utah law does not provide an exception for privately funded 
retiranent plans. The IRA Account is subject to division as the 
parties' retirement plan. Utah law requires that Elizabeth be 
awarded half of the assets accumulated in the retiranent account 
during the marriage. The Decree of Divorce makes such an award, 
giving Elizabeth judgment for half of the value of the retiranent 
account as of the date of the divorce. This judgment is consistent 
with the rule that distribution not be deferred. 
It would be inequitable and contrary to Utah law to deny such 
an award to Elizabeth. The IRA payments were reported as if they 
were paid from current income, to defer taxation on current 
earnings. As money is fungible, it should be considered of no 
consequence that the parties1 savings were depleted to set up their 
retiranent account. This only freed up their current income for 
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ordinary household expenses. 
In any event/ the parties used marital funds to set up the IRA 
account. Funds for this purpose were taken from the Ready Asset 
Account/ in which David's pre-marital funds and those of the parties 
had been commingled (Tr. 742/ 755-762). The Ready Asset Account was 
constantly used as a marital resource. The purchase of the parties' 
retirement account with funds withdrawn from it is just another 
example of this use. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION OR 
OTHERWISE ERR IN MAKING HIS AWARD OF ALIMONY 
Elizabeth was awarded $250.00 a month alimony. The appellant 
claims that this order is not supported by the law or the evidence, 
and should be reversed and vacated. The appellant argues (1) that 
the trial court erred by failing to equalize the parties1 standard 
of living, and (2) that the Findings of Fact are inadequate. 
In fact, the formal Findings of Fact are sufficiently detailed 
to support the alimony order. Those pertaining to alimony are as 
follows: 
16. The defendant is employed as a bus driver 
for Granite School District and as a part-time 
chaplain for the Utah State Prison. The 
defendant receives an annual director's fee of 
$2,000.00 from Wilson Land Development Co., a 
business founded by his father. His gross income 
frcm these three sources is $1,747.00 (R. 253). 
17. The plaintiff was not employed outside 
the home during the marriage. The plaintiff was 
not employed outside the home at the time of the 
divorce [trial]. She obtained employment as a 
receptionist prior to the ruling entered herein. 
She is now earning $960.00 a month, gross (R. 
253). 
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26. Based on the standard of living enjoyed 
by the parties during their marriage, the 
incomes of the parties, the needs of the 
plaintiff, and the defendant's ability to pay, 
it is reasonable, just, and equitable that the 
defendant should be ordered to pay alimony in 
the amount of $250.00 a month. Said alimony 
shall terminate upon the plaintiff's remarriage, 
cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, 
or death (R. 254, 25). 
The appellant claims that these findings are insufficient 
because they do not mention Elizabeth's ability to provide for 
herself, and because they do not include the parties' living 
expenses. Neither charge is correct. Finding 17 concerns Elizabeth's 
employment record and states the terms of her present employment. 
Finding 26 addresses all of the necessary elements, including the 
standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their marriage. In 
any event, it is not necessary for a trial court's written findings 
to set forth all factors, but only those which it considers to be 
most pertinent. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Further, the findings of the court are not limited to the 
formal Findings of Fact. They may also be set forth in oral 
statements of the court. Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 856 (Utah 
App. 1989). In the case now on appeal, the trial judge stated that 
he had plenty of information on living expenses of the parties and 
their incomes (Tr. 738). The court stated that there was not enough 
money to go around and that it was imperative for both of the 
parties to seek additional employment (Tr. 850). At that point in 
the proceedings, Elizabeth was not employed. Responding to the 
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directive of the trial court she got a job (before the alimony was 
awarded) (R, 141. David did nothing to improve his situation* 
Taken together, the formal Findings of Fact and the statements 
made by the trial judge during the proceedings are more than 
sufficient to meet the standard established in this jurisdiction. 
That is, the findings must (1) include enough facts to disclose the 
process through which the ultimate conclusion is reached, (2) 
indicate the process is logical and properly supported, and (3) be 
not clearly erroneous. Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 202-203 
(Utah App. 1987). 
After the trial, David's lawyer filed a 27-page Request for 
Clarification of Minute Entry, Objections to Proposed Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree, and Motion to Reconsider Judgment (R. 
194-224). A hearing was had on these motions and objections, 
including those pertaining to the alimony award (R. 199-200, 
204-205, 215-218). It was charged that the alimony award gave 
Elizabeth an unfair share of the parties1 combined income, that 
David would not have enough money left over to meet his own 
expenses, and that Elizabeth wasn't entitled to alimony because of 
the term of the marriage and her college education. The written 
objections and motions before the court at that hearing contained 
detailed itemizations of expenses, income, and the net effect of the 
trial court's alimony order, taken together with the orders for 
child support and day-care expenses (R. 204-205, 215-216). 
During the post-trial hearing of David's objections and 
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motions, he protested the $250.00 alimony award, claiming his client 
couldn't afford to pay it. In response, the trial court stated, "he 
[David] ought to go out and get a job" (Tr. 868). And again, "He 
[David] says he has all that time to spend with the kids. He better 
take that time and go work somewhere else" (Tr. 869). 
Although Elizabeth's revised Financial Declaration was not 
formally introduced into evidence, it was in the file and it appears 
that the judge was familiar with its contents (Tr. 737, R. 107-110). 
Elizabeth testified that her expenses were $2,100.00 a month 
(Tr.63). David attempted to establish that her expenses were much 
lower on the basis of his allegations that the expenses for the 
entire family, before the separation, had been only $1,100.00 a 
month (Tr. 644, 646). Almost simultaneously he alleged that his 
expenses, for himself alone, not including child support, were 
$1,501.00 (Tr. 619). His evidence is not credible. 
In any event, after the separation Elizabeth had new expenses, 
for which no payment was needed before the separation. For example, 
David testified that while the parties lived together he did the 
household repairs and yard maintenance (Tr. 706-707). David claimed 
that without his work on the house, the cost of maintaining it would 
be as burdensome as the monthly payment [$354.00] (Tr. 844). 
Alimony is to be based on the paying spouse's ability to pay. 
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978). The ability to pay is 
not defined by the paying spouse's income at time of divorce. In 
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah App. 1988), an award 
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of alimony was upheld even though payment would require the husband 
to liquidate his sole and separate property. In Paffel v. Paffel,, 
732 P. 2d 96, 102 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court declared that 
trial courts could consider a second spouse's income as a source for 
payment of alimony to a first spouse. In Mortensen, supra, at 308, 
it was held that property awarded to the husband would be considered 
as an income source when considering alimony and child support. 
David was awarded assets (an equity in the house, a Blazer, 
and the Merrill Lynch Accounts), which could be used by him to make 
alimony payments. In addition, his parents, who have always assisted 
him financially, can assist him in making his alimony payments. This 
would be no less proper that receiving assistance through a second 
wife, as in Paffel, supra. 
(The extent of David's reliance on his parents became very 
apparent during the divorce proceedings. In spite of his modest 
income, he had funds available to pay for two expert witnesses, to 
pay witness' travel and living expenses, to pay his own substantial 
living expenses (Tr. 170-174, 277, 341-342, 762). He was able to 
come up with $6,500.00 to pay to Elizabeth for the Blazer. In 
addition, some notice must be given to the fact that he had the 
resources to mount this appeal, involving not only the services of 
an attorney, but also the transcription of 876 pages of transcript.) 
As for Elizabeth's ability to earn income, she testified that 
except for seme part-time work in a pre-school in 1983-1984, and two 
temporary sales jobs after the separation, she had not worked 
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outside the home (Tr. 46-48). The only evidence about her earning 
capacity is her own testimony that she thought she could earn 
between $900.00 and $1,000.00 a month and, later, that in fact she 
had secured a job for $960.00 a month (Tr. 960, R. 141). Further, it 
is improbable that Elizabeth's potential will ever come close to 
David's. The function of the alimony award is to help equalize the 
disparity in the parties' incomes, taking into account the disparate 
circumstances and opportunities of the parties. The alimony order 
and the findings upon which it rests are in conformance with the 
guidelines articulated by Justice Durham in Higley v. Higley, 676 
P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
It is charged that the trial judge erred in ordering David to 
pay $5,000.00 toward Elizabeth's attorney's fees, alleging that 
David does not have the ability to pay these fees. Elizabeth's need 
and the reasonableness of her fees are not disputed. 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), cited by the 
appellant as the foundational case for alimony, requires only that 
the award be based on need and reasonableness. Other considerations 
rest in the discretion of the court. Appellant refers only to a much 
earlier case for the proposition that the trial court must consider 
the ability of the other party to pay. Ghost v. Ghost, 26 Utah 2d 
398, 490 P.2d 339 (1971). It is not at all clear that Utah law now 
requires conclusive proof that the party charged has the ability to 
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pay from current income, while not taking into account other 
resources available for payment. It would appear that the test is 
who is most able to pay. 
The evidence is that David has a far greater ability to pay 
Elizabeth's attorney's fees than she does. His gross income is 
almost double hers. As set forth in the Findings of Fact, his income 
is $1,747.00; hers was only $960.00 (R.258). Elizabeth is working 
full time as a receptionist, in addition to having the primary 
responsibility for caring for the children, supervising their 
education, and maintaining the home. David is working as a bus 
driver, 6:00-9:00 a.m. and 2:30-5:00 p.m., plus 19.5 hours or less a 
week at the Prison, nine months a year (Tr. 697). During the other 
three months, he works only at the Prison (Tr. 614). Although he had 
a Master of Divinity degree, he seems to be content with his present 
employment. 
The trial court directed both parties to improve their 
employment. By the final hearing, Elizabeth had done so. However, 
the defendant gave no indication that he had done anything to 
improve his situation. The evidence is clear that David is 
under-employed and that he could easily increase his income but 
elects not to (Tr. 868). He stated as much (Tr. 863). He admitted 
that additional hours were available to him on his bus driving job. 
He stated that he could earn additional income if it were necessary 
(R. 156). David could earn an extra $2,000.00 during the summer 
months (Tr. 863, R. 132-133). 
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Nsv'.": ^Ireless, it is clear that the court did not take possible 
income into account in making its award of attorney's fees (Tr. 863, 
R. 253-254). This becomes clear when it is recognized that Elizabeth 
was awarded less than half of her legal expenses. Elizabeth was 
awarded only $5,000.00 in attorney's fees, even though the fees and 
costs itemized in the first application were $12,095.00 (R. 161-169). 
Because her need and the reasonableness of her request were clear, 
as now conceded, it must be concluded that the award was reduced on 
the basis of David's circumstances. 
Further, the court denied a second application for attorney's 
fees was filed by Elizabeth's attorney, for services rendered after 
trial but before entry of the Decree of Divorce (R. 338). Once 
again, it appears that the trial court took David's circumstances 
into account. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding 
the plaintiff half of the marital property. 
The court properly found that all property belonging to the 
parties was marital property and did not abuse his discretion by 
evenly dividing this property, under all of the circumstances of 
this case, including the fact that the plaintiff made significant 
contributions to the joint efforts of the parties as a full-time 
housewife and mother of the parties' four small children. Contrary 
to appellant's charge, Utah law does not require that all property 
brought into the marriage by a spouse be returned to him upon 
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divorce, especially as in this case, where it has become ccxttningledc 
The gifts received during the marriage from defendant's parents have 
been corrtningled and have lost their unique identity. In any event 
they were gifts to both parties, and even if they had not been, 
equity would require an even division of the modest estate to 
protect the interests of the children and to allow the plaintiff to 
continue in a standard of living at least similar to that enjoyed 
during the marriage. 
POINT II: David [defendant] should not be allowed to claim any 
additional award for his parents' gift for the Blazer, 
because he has taken said vehicle from Elizabeth 
[plaintiff], Against her Will and Contrary to the Stay of 
Execution, and has paid her $6,5000.00 for said vehicle, 
as ordered by the trial court. 
Having succeeded in getting the order he wanted on the Blazer, 
and having unilaterally proceeded to act on that order, in spite of 
the stay of execution filed by his attorney, it would be totally 
inequitable and unjust to allow the defendant to ask for a credit 
for his parents' gift used to purchase this asset. 
POINT III: The trial court did not err in including specific gifts 
made by the defendant's parents as part of the marital 
estate. 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding 
plaintiff $6,500.00 for her interest in the Blazer and to assist her 
in buying a new car. The trial J|udge did not abuse his discretion in 
equally dividing the equity in the marital residence. The defendant 
consented that the court should decide the plaintiff's equity in 
these assets. The gifts received from defendant's parents were to 
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both parties. The gifts have, in any event, lost their separate 
identity. Even if the gifts had been made only to the defendant, in 
this divorce, involving three small children, and with a modest 
estate and limited resources, in large part due to the fact that the 
defendant has continued to work only part-time, equity demands an 
even division of the assets. 
POINT IV; The trial judge did not abuse his discretion or otherwise 
err in not awarding the defendant his alleged remnant of 
pre-marital property. 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion, as the 
parties' pre-marital and marital assets were commingled from the 
very beginning of the marriage, when the parties used part of their 
cash wedding gift to pay the defendant's tithe on his savings and 
then deposited the remainder of their wedding money with said 
savings. Not only is the plaintiff entitled to a share of the 
commingled savings, but also she is entitled to half of the 
retirement account which was created out of the commingled savings 
of the parties. 
POINT V: The trial judge did not abuse his discretion or otherwise 
err in making his award of alimony 
Contrary to the appellant's charges, the trial court had 
plenty of information concerning the plaintiff's expenses. He 
recognized the difficulty of the parties' situation and took all 
pertinent factors into consideration. The ability of the defendant 
to pay alimony is not limited to his income. It is proper that he 
should be expected to look to other resources, if necessary, to pay 
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alimony o 
POINT VI: The trial court did not err in the award of attorney's 
fees 
The court took into full account all factors required for 
consideration, as indicated by the fact that he awarded plaintiff 
less than half of her attorney's fees, which appellant now concedes 
were both needed by plaintiff and reasonable. 
aaraxjsioN 
The relief requested should be denied, and the Decree of 
Divorce should be upheld in its entirety. The trial judge did not 
err, as charged, in the distribution of property. Nor did he exceed 
his discretion in the awards of alimony and attorney's fees made to 
the plaintiff. 
As of the time of the divorce, all of the property held by the 
parties was marital property, including their house, the Blazer, the 
Ready Asset Account, and their retirement account. The property was 
divided in approximately equal shares, which was well within the 
discretion of the trial court. 
During the proceedings below, the defendant acknowledged the 
plaintiff's entitlement to a full share of the equity in the house 
and the Blazer. He did not at that time claim that he should be 
given a larger portion of the state on the basis of the 
contributions of his parents. The judgment below has been satisfied, 
in any event, as to the Blazer. 
The other assets of the parties fall well within the 
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exceptions of Mortensen, supra. The Merrill Lynch Ready Asset 
Account was ccxnmingled with marital property from the moment the 
parties deposited $3,000.00 from their wedding gift in this account, 
after first using $5,000.00 from their gift to pay David's then 
existing tithing obligation. Subsequently, withdrawals from this 
marital account were used for the parties•living expenses and to set 
up their retirement account. 
The Merrill Lynch Ready Asset Account has been used as, and 
is, a marital asset, and was properly divided by the trial court. 
The plaintiff is entitled to half of the IRA account, pursuant to 
principles of equitble distribution and more specific rulings 
concerning retirement accounts, such as Woodward, supra. 
The alimony award is necessary and proper, and should not be 
vacated or modified. The plaintiff demonstrated her need for this 
award and the trial court was fully aware of David's circumstances 
and his ability to pay alimony. David has the ability to pay the 
alimony ordered. His ability to pay alimony is properly not to be 
determined only on the basis of his present employment. The court 
could and did consider the fact that David was underemployed and 
directed the defendant to get a better job so that he could meet his 
obligations. Also, David has other resources to assist him in 
payment of his alimony obligation, including the property awarded to 
him and his parents1 bounty. 
The award of attorney's fees should not be vacated. The court 
awarded the plaintiff less than half of her legal expenses, which, 
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the defendant now recognizes to have been reasonable. The defendant 
in like matter now concedes that the plaintiff has a need for the 
award. The only question before the Court is the defendants ability 
to pay. Again, there is nothing in Utah law limiting the defendant's 
ability to pay to the use of his current inccxne. It is clear on the 
record that the defendant has the ability to pay. For so long as he 
thought it was to his advantage (before the Memorandum Decision was 
entered), the defendant took every opportunity to advise the trial 
judge that he could get extra money to effect the kind of property 
distribution he was urging upon the court. He can now exercise those 
options to obey the orders of the court as to alimony and attorney's 
fees. 
Respondent requests that the relief sought by appellant be 
denied in every particular, and that she be awarded her attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of December, 1989. 
JUDITH RQMNEY WOLBACH 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Respondent 
on the Appeal 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on Monday, December 18, 1989, I hand 
delivered four correct copies of the Brief of Respondent to counsel 
fo record for the Appellant, Kent M. Kasting, DART, ADAMSON & 
KASTING, 310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
<^ = : V^ — 
Judi th Romney Vfolbach 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Wife: Elizabeth A. Wilson 
Address: 5496 Snntih Hews Place 
g*u- T^V^ r i t -y . ntah 84118 












NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE. PRESENT. AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED 
WILL AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE 
BASIS FOR ITS DECISION. 
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALLSUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR PERJURY 
AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME. EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly flfures when income is received and deductions are 
made weekly, multiply by 4J; if flfures are on a bi-weekly basis, multiply by 2.167) 
I Gross monthly income from: 
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses. 
allowances and overtime, payable (pay 
period) _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ 
Pensions and retirement 
Social security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payments, etc.) 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividends and interest 
Rents 
All other sources: (Specify) 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME 
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income: 
State and federal income taxes 
3 
Number ol exemptions taken 
Social security 
Medical or other insurance (describe fully) 
Union or other dues 
Retirement or pension fund 







































TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
Net mom hi v income • take home pav 
j 
$
 |S 58.36 
s is 
.. L 391.64 1 
4 Debts and obligations 
Creditor's Name For Date Payable Balance Monthly Pavment 
CM7\C nar loan 





(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule) * as of 6/88 
5. All property of the parties lenown to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband. (W) Wife, (J) Jointly) 
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE 
Value Owed Thereon 
(a) Household furnishings, furniture, 
appliances, and equipment 
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) _ attached hereto 
Should be divided as per l i s t s s Miniirai 
1987 Chevrolet Rlazpr I 1979 Chevrolet pickup truck 
(c) Securities - stocks, bonds 
Merril Lvnch Readv Asset Acc't #56623210 
Church Bond Series 







(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings <& loans. 
credit unions • savings and checking) 
*as of 9/7/88 
**as of 1/1/88 
Dpfpndanf! s armnnt (s) Unknown 
P l a - i n - H f f ' g HngHHnrj ar rnnnf- Varies 
ryprns r . n Wilson dis t r ibut ing acc't #6438051 25,Q 
Cyprus—C.U. Wilson savings acc't #64^ 8f)qs ?nn.o 
(e) Life Insurance: 
Name of Company Poltcv No. Face Amount 
Cash value, accumulated 
dividend, or loan amount 
(0 Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts 
Name 
Value of interest and amount presently vested 
N a m e , ,—• 
(g) Other Personal Propenv and Assets (specifv) 
Plaintiff's jewelry, not part of the marital estate, having been receiived as an 
inhpni-^nrp, has b^en recently appraised at $2,500.00. After the separation of 
t-h<=> pprt-ipg thP r^fpndant made ,a gift of a computer to the plaintiff/ which is 
not part of the marital estate. 
A-2. 
(h) Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional property) 
Address 5596 Sn—Hews P l a r p 
c^ l t - T^kg Cii-y. TTT 3411 ft 
Original Cost S 5 5 , 9 0 0 . 0 0 
Cost of Additions S ; 
Total COM $ _ _ . 
Mtg Balance S 




Monthly Amortization S 
7ax«S 630 .33 
Individual contributions 
Type of Property M a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e 
Date of Acquisition 1 2 / 8 5 
Total Present Value < 5 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Basis of valuation Tax a p p r a i s a l 
And to whom 
(0 Business interest (Indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness) 
(j) Other assets (Specify) 
6 Total monthly expenses. '(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose 
expenses are included.) 
• P l a i n t - - i f f i s mi.q-r-nHi^l p;3rvant- n-F f-hp 1 nh i lHrvan 
HUSBAND WIFE 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) 
Real property taxes (residence) 
Real property insurance (residence) - ± . 
Ma.ntenancelrevdence) i n c l u d e s y a r d Work 
Food and household supplies — 
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat 
Telephone ; 




Insurance (lile. health, accident, comprehensive liability, 
disability) Exclude Cay roll Deducted 
Child care Mhn-hessori School 
Payment ol child spousal support re prior marriage 
School — _ _ _ - _ _ — - _ _ _ - — - _ — — _ — — — 
Entertainment (include?* clubs, social obligations, travel recreation). 
incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations) 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto expense (gas. oil. repair, insurance) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Auto payments _____-_ ._____—____-_——— 
Installment payment(s) (Insert total and attach itemized schedule 
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof) 
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule) S P P h p l P W * 
TOTAL EXPENSES 


















STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
1 swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this **' ' day of A IJrn^ JitA . 19 ^ f 
Notary Public residing in Salt Lake County. Utah 
My Commission Expires 
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, INCLUDING 
BUT NOT LIMITED TO. PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS. 3 MOST RECENT TAX 
RETURNS. CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED 
CHECKS, CERTIFICATES. POLICIES, AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
A-f 
RLS3 0?ST3iST SflUST 
Tr,;rd JuGfCtal Dis&ftWY AT LAW 
By 
SUITE C-105 
M A & 4 8 E&T 1Qg§H UNION AVENUE 
I i n i \ w «^^ A L E > UTAH 34047 
TELEPHONE 
r.,, - .^r^v --v(89fV255-7600/566-1285 
ueputy Clerk 
February 10, 1989 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
240 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Wilson vs. Wilson, Case No. D88-642 
Dear Judge Rokich: 
Pursuant to your request at Tuesday's hearing in the 
above-jenti tied matter, I am enclosing a letter from 
Granite School District concerning the amount of the 
deduction from Mr. Wilson's' check which is directly 
related to providing health and accident insurance for 
the children. When I prepared the Child Support 
Guidelines, I estimated that amount at $50.00 per month. 
The actual amount is $53.97. We do not believe the 
difference to be great and will consent to the entry of 
child support based on our earlier calculations. 
With respect to the division of the other monetary 
assets, my client has suggested the following for your 
consideration. 
Should the home be awarded to him, he would suggest 
that he also be awarded the Blazer and that Elizabeth be 
awarded a $10,000.00 lien against the home and a $5,00.00 
or $6,000.00 cash payment for her interest in the Blazer 
and that she be given the entire amount currently in the 
Redi-asset account of approximately $2,000.00. He would 
also agree to pay out her interest in the home over a 
five (5) year period of time. That would amount to an 
additional $2,000.00 per year. In total, she would 
receive an immediate cash settlement of $8,000.00 or 
$9,000.00 with which she could purchase a suitable 
vehicle. She would also be receiving approximately 
$2,000.00 per year for the next five (5) years. 
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Page Two 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
February 10, 1989 
This proposal would give her some immediate cash with 
which to begin a new life as well as quickly cashing out 
her equity in the home. It would allow Mr. Wilson to 
enjoy the physical gifts given to him by his parents and 
would wave the tax loss associated with splitting the 
IRA. In total, Elizabeth would receive $18,000.00
 1 
$20,000.00 in equity, all of which was donated by Mr. 
Wilson's Father. If this amount is not satisfactory to 
you, the amounts could be altered by the Court either up 
or down. 
Mr. Wilson believes that he could locate summer 
employment to earn the funds sufficient to cover the 
yearly payments. 
I hope this may be of help to you in resolving this 
matter. 
I am filing herewith a coun ter-jAf f idavi t on the 
issue of Attorney fees and am sending a copy of this 
letter to Mrs. Wolbach. 
Very truly yours, 
LJC/dj 
Enclosure 
cc: Mr. David Wilson 
Mrs. Judith Wolbach 
A 
J U D I T H R O M N E Y W O L B A C H 
A T T O R N E Y AT L A W 
T H E V A L L E Y T O W E R . S U I T E 9 0 0 
5 0 W E S T B R O A D W A Y 
SALT LAKE CITY. U T A H 8 4 1 01 
( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 3 - 6 2 2 2 
By 
February 21/ 1989 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Wilson vs. Wilson 
Case No. D88-642 
Dear Judge Rokich: 
Mrs. Wilson was hired/ as of yesterday, as a receptionist by 
Attorneys Richard Bojanowski/ Jane Allen, Craig Coburn, Keith 
Henderson/ Daniel Boone and Tony Thurber. Her rate of pay is $6.00 
an hour, $960.00 a month. 
The additional cost for day care at Montessori School, necessitated 
by Mrs. Wilson's employment, is only $50.00 a month, bringing to 
$500.00 a month the total cost of the children's day care and 
education. It appears reasonable to me that at least two-thirds of 
this cost, $333.00 (for the younger two children), should be 
considered as the cost of day care necessary to permit Mrs. Wilson 
to work. 
I have brought this information to your attention by this informal 
means / so that you would have it available for the purposes of 
making your final ruling in these proceedings. We are looking 
forward to receiving your memorandum decision as soon as possible. 
Sincerely/ 
Judith Rctnney Wolbach 
JRW:rw 
cc: Lynn J Clark/ Esq. 
Elizabeth Wilson 
F ^ 3 8iS7S!S7C8SaT 
»ftira Judicial District 
MAR 6 1989 




LYNN J CLARK, #4013 
Attorney for Defendant 
948 E. North Union Avenue 
Suite -105 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 255-;7600 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH A. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
PROPOSALS OF 
CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS 
C a s e No. D88-j642 
J u d g e J o h n A. R o k i c h 
P u r s u a n t t o O r d e r of t h i s c o u r t , D e f e n d a n t , Dav id R. 
W i l s o n , b y a n d t h r o u g h h i s A t t o r n e y , L y n n J C l a r k , 
h e r e b y p r e s e n t t o t h e C o u r t h i s p r o p o s a l s c o n c e r n i n g 
c u s t o d y of t h e p a r t i e s 1 m i n o r c h i l d r e n . 
PREFACE 
I t i s t h e i n t e n t of Defendant in t h i s p r o p o s a l to s e t 
f o r t h what he b e l i e v e s t o be in t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of h i s 
c h i l d r e n and h i s Wife and h i m s e l f . D e f e n d a n t f i r m l y 
b e l i e v e s t h a t h e i s t h e p a r e n t who h a s and who h a s 
c o n t i n u a l l y d e m o n s t r a t e d h i m s e l f t o be t h e b e t t e r p a r e n t 
a n d s h o u l d b e a w a r d e d e i t h e r p r i m e o r a t l e a s t 
c o n t r o l l i n g p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y of t h e minor c h i l d r e n . 
1 
Defendant believes that joint legal custody of the 
children pursuant to Section 30-j3-;10.1 et. seq. of the 
Utah Code Ann. is proper in this instance subject to each 
parents' pre-defined rights in certain areas. 
Defendant believes that inspite of which parent the 
Court may choose to be awarded physical or primary 
physical custody of the children, an extremely liberal 
schedule of visitation for the non-;custodial parent 
should be granted. 
Specifically responding to the Court's request, the 
following is submitted. 
If the Plaintiff were to be awarded the gr imagy 
physical custody of the children and £_h£ £2i2^ A£]i£.!L t Q 
reside in the Salt Lake County area, Defendant would 
propose the following visitation: 
£ tY°Y 1. Alternating weekends from Friday after school 
through placing the children in school the following 
Monday. Such visitation would increase to include either 
the Thursday night Friday period or the Monday, Monday 
night period where a three (3) day weekend from school 
is scheduled. 
2. One (1) night each week from the time school is 
out until 8:00 p.m. that evening. 
2 
A 
3e A l t e rna t i ng major hol idays inc lud ing January 1 s t , 
Memorial DayT Ju ly 4 th , Ju ly 24th, and Labor Day.' Such 
v i s i t a t i o n s to begin the evening p r i o r to the holiday and 
cont inue through the hol iday u n t i l 8:00 p.m. except for 
the 4th and 24th of Ju ly on which occasions the ch i ld ren 
should spend the n i g h t wi th Defendant and be r e t u r n e d 
home the next morning by 10:00 a.m. 
4. F a t h e r ' s Day, Defendant 's b i r t h d a y , s ix (6) hours 
on each of the c h i l d r e n ' s b i r t h d a y s . 
5. A l t e r n a t i n g Thanksg iv ings b e g i n n i n g Wednesday 
e v e n i n g a t 6 :00 p .m. and c o n t i n u i n g t h r o u g h Sunday 
Evening a t 7:00 p.m. 
6. An a l t e r n a t i n g Chr i s tmas v a c a t i o n wherein the 
ch i ld ren would spend Christmas Eve and Christmas Day with 
one paren t and Christmas Day and the following f ive (5) 
days w i t h t h e o t h e r p a r e n t . Such a r r a n g e m e n t t o 
a l t e r n a t e on a year by year b a s i s . 
7. Two-thirds (2/3) of the summer vacat ion period to 
begin no sooner than one (1) week a f t e r school i s out and 
end no l a t e r t h a t one (Vi;) week p r io r to school resuming. 
8 . A s e p a r a t e s u m m e r v i s i t a t i o n w i t h t h e 
grandparents of seven (7) days to be arranged during the 
3 
A-to 
summer vacation period, together with reasonable 
telephone access to the children. 
If Defendant were to remain in Utah and be awarded 
physical custody, he would suggest t:jiaj: J^ he following 
visitation be granted to the plaintiff: 
Defendant would propose essentially the same 
visitation for Plaintiff as he had proposed for himself 
except that he would propose that she be entitled to one-
half (1/2) of the summer vacation period. 
He would add that he is willing to grant Plaintiff 
additional unscheduled time as such time is requested by 
Plaintiff for special events or other special needs. He 
is also willing to be sensitive to the children's needs 
as they individually or collectively may desire to see 
their Mother during unscheduled periods of time. 
LL ££AHJ: Zl2X5.i££i: £i^^-^2^X ^£££ to b£ 2££J2^££LL 
Defendant would propose the following: 
Defendant believes that a joint custody arrangement 
or something very near to it would be in the children1 s 
best interest. He nevertheless understands that 
communication and negotiation with Plaintiff is, at least 
at this time nearly impossible. He is suggesting that be 
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be granted the use of the marital home and that he be 
designated as the prime custodial parent. Again, 
visitation should be clearly defined with the possible 
exception of special needs which may arise for either the 
parents or the children. Such visitation should provide 
for nearly equal time for both parents. The above 
suggested schedules or that schedule suggested by Dr. 
Victor Cline in his report would essentially cover those 
needs. The one exception Defendant would make to Dr. 
Cline1s recommendations is that Dr. Cline1s suggestion 
that the non^prime custodian spend every weekend with the 
children during the school year. Such a schedule would 
deprive the prime custodial parent of the ability to take 
the children shopping, skiing or traveling for almost 
nine (9) months of the year and would also prevent the 
other parent from using those weekends for anything other 
than visitations with the children. For these reasons, 
Defendant believes that weekend visitation should be 
established as three (3) per month rather than every 
weekend. 
Whjat: sJio^ uJLd the ££s>u_lj: be LL ill® E^££Hi StJio il 
assigned primary physical custody moves out of the State 
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of Utah 0£ .sU£]i d i s t a n c e a s would f.£ii£^££jt<e Jthe u s u a l 
v i s i t a t i o n . 
D e f e n d a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d be 
encouraged t o remain l i v i n g in t h e same c l o s e g e o g r a p h i c 
l o c a t i o n fo r t he b e n e f i t of t h e c h i l d r e n . Although he 
has no p l a n s t o move and i s committed to r ema in ing in t h e 
S a l t Lake a r e a , P l a i n t i f f h a s , on numerous o c c a s i o n s 
e x p r e s s e d h e r i n t e n t i o n s t o l e a v e t h e S t a t e of U t a h . 
Whi le D e f e n d a n t i s e m p l o y e d in S a l t Lake and f e e l s an 
o n g o i n g r e l i g i o u s c o m m i t m e n t a s w e l l a s a m o r a l 
commitment t o the inmates he m i n i s t e r s t o a t t he p r i s o n , 
P l a i n t i f f has no such t i e s . Defendant a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t 
even though P l a i n t i f f i s employed by Fred Meyer, she has 
no t worked fo r t h a t company u n t i l t h e week p r i o r to t h e 
t r i a l of t h i s m a t t e r , a l m o s t t h r e e (3) weeks a g o . I f 
t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n i s c o r r e c t , P l a i n t i f f does no t have even 
an employment t i e w i th t h e S t a t e . 
D e f e n d a n t ' s recommendation i s t h a t t he Cour t o r d e r a 
c u s t o d y r e v i e w i f and when t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t moves 
from t h e S t a t e to a l o c a t i o n s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t a n t from 
S a l t L a k e C i t y t o p r e v e n t t h e n o r m a l l y e x p e c t e d 
v i s i t a t i o n . 
Should t h e n o n c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t chose t o move, such a 
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move would be at that parent's discretion, but that 
parent would be entitled to the previously defined 
visitation to the extent that it could be accomplished 
given the distances involved and the related expense. 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSAL OF CUSTODY 
Defendant proposes that he be granted primary 
physical custody of the three (3) minor children subject 
to extremely liberal visitation and/or secondary physical 
custody of the children. He also proposes that he be 
restored to the marital home. These proposals are based 
on the following: 
1. As was admitted by Plaintiff and substantiated by 
virtually every witness, Plaintiff is a good Father and, 
in fact, according to Dr. Cline, "the most committed 
Father I have ever met." Dr. Stewart also conceded that 
Defendants parenting skills were better than those of 
Plaintiff. His degree of involvement with the children 
including playtime and education is much greater than has 
been Plaintiff's. He is more concerned with virtually 
every facet of their lives including their dress, their 
diet, their discipline, their education, their spiritual 
development and their social development. 
7 
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2. The children should remain living in the marital 
home as it provides a base of stability for them. The 
home, however, is also a burden as it requires constant 
maintenance, repair and landscaping work. 
Mrs. Wilson is not prepared, nor is she capable of 
performing these functions herself. Should she be 
awarded the home, either the repairs, maintenance and 
yard work will go undone, decreasing the value and 
appearance of the home, or she will have to expend family 
resources which are in short supply resulting in those 
funds not being available for the children. 
Currently, Mr. Wilson is both trained and capable of 
doing virtually all of the home maintenance and is in a 
much better position to do so without having to trade 
maintenance for the children's needs. 
3. As a further reason that Mr. Wilson should remain 
in the home, we would point out that he is in a better 
financial position to assume the increased costs 
associated with the home as compared to an apartment or 
other rental. He is gainfully employed and has the 
option of working some additional "overtime" type work. 
Additionally, the funds used to purchase the home 
have come substantially from Mr. Wilson's parents and he 
8 
should be entitled to enjoy the fruits of their gifts to 
him. 
What should be done with the equity in the home and 
Blazer inasmuch as those items were purchased with funds 
received by Defendant from his parents. 
HOME 
Testimony was clear that Defendant's parents provided 
approximately Twenty Seven Thousand Dollars ($27,000.00) 
which was used to purchase the marital homee Seven 
Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) of that amount was intended 
to be in the form of a loan and irrespective of which of 
the parties are awarded the home, that Seven Thousand 
Dollars ($7,000.00) should be recognized by the Court as 
a loan which is due to Mr. Wilson, Sr. and should be 
included or considered as a liability which liability 
should be assumed by the party being awarded the home. 
The remaining Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) was 
received as an inheritance by Defendant from his parents 
and was not a gift to both parties. Nevertheless, these 
people have little in the form of assets. Should 
Defendant be awarded the home, a faith and equitable lien 
should be granted to the Plaintiff pending the re-} 
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marriage of Defendant, the children reaching majority or 
the sale of the home. Should Plaintiff be awarded the 
home* She should be required to accept the home subject 
to the current mortgage and the Seven Thousand Dollar 
($7,000.00) loan from Mr. Wilson. Defendant should be 
granted a lien against the property in a reasonable 
amount to be determined by the Court. Plaintiff should 
be allowed to remain in the home for two (2) to three (3) 
years subject to her assuming the mortgage and upkeep of 
the home and it should thereafter be placed for sale and 
the equity divided. 
BLAZER 
Again , t h e B laze r was pu rchased wi th funds g iven t o 
Mr. W i l s o n by h i s p a r e n t s . They s u p p l i e d n e a r l y 
Seven teen Thousand D o l l a r s ($17 ,000 .00) by way of cash 
and a t r a d e - i n v e h i c l e w h i c h was u sed t o p u r c h a s e t h e 
v e h i c l e . 
Al though t h e B laze r c o s t a lmos t Twenty Three Thousand 
D o l l a r s ( $ 2 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) when i t was new, i t s c u r r e n t n e t 
v a l u e , i f i t w e r e t o be s o l d , w o u l d m o s t l i k e l y be 
$10 ,000 .00 -j $ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
I t i s u n f a i r t h a t i n a m a r r i a g e w h e r e t h e p a r t i e s 
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have relatively few assets that Plaintiff be awarded a 
Twenty Three Thousand Dollar ($23,000.00) vehicle which 
was essentially a gift to the Defendant while Defendant 
is left to drive a nearly ten (10) year old pick-up truck 
having some 95,000 miles on it. True, it is in good 
shape for a vehicle that old, but overall it should not 
be expected to last long as his primary source of 
transportation. It currently is in need of new head 
gaskets, a new windshield and some other minor repairs. 
Defendant realizes that Plainitff is in need of 
transportation and has suggested that he provide 
Plaintiff with Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or such 
other reasonable amount that the Court feels is just, 
with which she can purchase a replacement vehicle. That 
amount is based on an approximate equal division of the 
expected net proceeds were the Blazer to be sold. 
If the Blazer is ordered sold, there will be a loss 
to both parties, which loss could be avoided by awarding 
the vehicle to Defendant with an equitable payment to 
Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff argues that she needs dependable, safe 
transportation for herself and the children, Defendant 
has those same needs. Plaintiff could easily purchase 
11 
another vehicle which could meet her needs and Defendant 
could have his gift restored to him under his proposal„ 
DATED this J day of February, 1989. 
y 









JUDITH ROMNEY TOLBACH (3534) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-6222 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH A. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON, 
Defendant. 
ATTORNEY'S AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. D-88-642 
Judge John A. Rokich 
1. Plaintifffs attorney is a member of the Utah State Bar Association 
and the Salt Lake County Bar Association, duly licensed and admitted to 
practice law in the State and Federal Courts of Utah and the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
2. Plaintiff's attorney commenced the practice of law in 1975, and 
since that time has devoted most of her practice to family law. 
3. Her hourly rate for legal services is $95.00 an hour, with no 
differential for court work. 
4. Upon inquiry, this rate appears to be scmewhat below the moderate 
range in the community, for an attorney with her skill and experience, in the 
practice of family law. Overall, in the practice of family law in the 
conmunity, the range in attorney's fees is frcm $75.00 to $150.00 an hour. 
5. Plaintiff's total attorney's fees in this action, to date, are 





$10/241c00/ plus her costs/ as set forth in the schedule attached hereto. It 
is anticipated that approximately five more hours, $475.00 in fees, will be 
required for the hearing on February 7, 1989/ and preparing the Findings of 
Fact/ Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. 
6. In addition, the plaintiff has incurred expenses, including 
attorney's fees and costs of court, in the approximate amount of $1,450, for 
her prior representation by Kenn Hanson, Esq. 
7. The primary issue in this case has been custody of the children. It 
is of significance, when considering the issue of attorneyfs fees, that the 
defendant took the position, as set forth in his Answer, that the plaintiff is 
lacking in emotional stablility, suffers from a post-abortion syndrome, and is 
therefore unfit to have custody of the children. Apparently proceding on that 
premise, he insisted on the plaintiff undergoing four evaluations: first by 
Dr. Fisher; second by Dr. Praman; third, by Dr. Stewart, and, fourth, by Dr. 
Cline. This fact alone greatly increased the plaintiff's attorney's fees. 
8. The defendant has prepared, or has caused to be prepared, many 
documents in which he has attempted to besmirch the character and reputation 
of the plaintiff, many of which are presently on file with the Court, and many 
of which, his counsel indicated, would be introduced at trial. Most of these 
documents were lengthy and hand-written. It was necessary for plaintiff's 
attorney to read and analyze these documents, which took many hours that 
otherwise would have been unnecessary. 
9. On a number of occasions, plaintiff's attorney has been informed by 
Mr. Clark that his client, the defendant, wanted to pick up his personal 
belongings. Mr. Clark was advised that his client could pick up his clothing 
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and other personal effects if he would agree on a date and hour for doing so. 
No arrangements were ever made for this purpose, and the complaints continued, 
again increasing the plaintiff's attorney's fees unnecessarily. 
10. The defendant overreacted when there were problems with visitation, 
on several occasions calling the police. Again, this caused the plaintiff to 
incur additional attorney's fees which otherwise would not have been 
necessary. 
11. The defendant has acted in a manner consistent with his desire to 
postpone the granting of a divorce, which has caused the plaintiff to incur 
additional legal expenses. 
12. The defendant has taken the unwarranted position that the plaintiff 
is entitled to no part of the property acquired during the marriage (other 
than some furniture), totally disregarding the fact that the pre-marital 
assets of the defendant have been co-mingled with marital assets from the very 
outset of the marriage of the parties. 
13. Since the trial, the plaintiff attempted to negotiate a settlement 
of the personal property of the parties, exclusive of motor vehicles, as 
directed by the Court. The defendant has insisted that the plaintiff make all 
of the concessions; he will make none. 
14. The defendant has taken a dogmatic, absolutist stance with respect 
to all of the issues in these divorce proceedings, which has made negotiation 
of a settlement impossible, increasing the costs of this action inneasurably. 
15. It appears that the defendant has had unlimited funds to spend in 
this divorce action, and that he has attempted to do his best to intimidate 
the plaintiff through his superior spending capability. Consider, for example 
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that he paid the expenses of lay witnesses brought in from Idaho and Wyoming. 
16. The undersigned began her representation of the plaintiff on or 
about June 6, 1988, as successor counsel to Kenn Hanson, who had rroved frcm 
the State. During that month, counsel spent 7.5 hours representing the 
plaintiff, including but not limited to telephone conferences with Mr. Hanson 
(0.5 hour), conferences with the plaintiff (2.25 hours), reviewing Mr. 
Hanson's and the Court's files, reviewing documents provided by the plaintiff 
(1.5 hours), reviewing and analyzing Dr. Prammanf s report (0.75 hr.), 
reviewing post-abortion syndrome materials in the file (0.5 hour), and 
drafting a Motion for Temporary Relief and a proposed Stipulation (1/5 hour). 
17. In July, 1988, the attempts for settlement having failed, the 
defendant filed an Order to Show Cause and hearing was had thereon and on 
plaintiff's Response, before Commissioner Peuler. A second hearing was held 
inmediately thereafter before Judge Rokich on the issue of summer visitation, 
and the remaining issues were taken under advisement by the Commissioner. 
Extensive research was undertaken by the undersigned during this month on the 
factual and legal issues concerning custody, as framed by the defendant. A 
total of 7.75 hours were billed to the plaintiff during this month. 
18. In August, 1988, the parties received the Conmissioner's Memorandum 
Recommendation, and the defendant filed his Objection thererto. The plaintiff 
served Interrogatories on the defendant. There were several conferences with 
the plaintiff, primarily concerning visitation, custody, and the children's 
school. During this month, the undersigned filed a Certification of Readiness 
for Trial with the Court, asking that trial be scheduled before September 22, 
1988, as Dr. Stewart's report would be ready by that date and discovery would 
-4-
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be completed. Total time this month, 4.5 hours. 
19. Mr. Clark scheduled hearing on his Objections to the Commissioner's 
August 9th Recomnendations for September 13th. Hearing on the plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories was scheduled for the same date. 
At the hearing, Mr. Clark advised the Court that he desired to obtain another 
custody evaluation, which was strongly objected to by the undersigned. Mr. 
Clark was given leave by the Court to obtain this evaluation. The plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel was not heard, due to time constraints. On September 15th, a 
pretrial was held before Commissioner Peuler, after which, a two-day trial was 
scheduled. Dr. Stewart's Custody Evaluation was on file with the Court by 
September 21st and was subsequently reviewed by the undersigned. Total time 
for September and October, 4.25 hours. 
20. During November, plaintiff's attorney prepared and served upon the 
defendant Requests for Production and responded to the defendant's discovery, 
having previously reviewed and analyzed the documents and information provided 
by the plaintiff. There were several in-office and telephone conferences with 
the plaintiff during this month. Total this month, 3.75 hours. 
21. During December, counsel for the plaintiff reviewed and analyzed 
information pertaining to physical and mental abuse of the plaintiff during 
the marriage, subpoenaed documents frcm GMAC, consulted with Dr. Stewart and 
dealt with Dr. Cline, by telephone and letter, in attempts to acquire a copy 
of his report and of the video he had prepared. Total this month, 2.25 hours. 
22. In January, 1989, plaintiff's attorney spent over 26.75 hours in 
trial preparation, prior to commencement of trial. This included: 
(a) Reading and analyzing Dr. Cline's report, viewing his video 
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interviews, research concerning relevant rules of evidence, and initial 
preparation of his examination, 6.0 hours. 
(b) Consulting with Dr. Stewart, analyzing her report, and preparation 
of her examination, 4.0 hours. 
(c) Conducting general legal research on property and custody issues, 
2.5 hours. 
(d) Reviewing and analyzing the many documents in the file, including 
the long letter to the Cormissioner filed by the defendant and the Affidavits; 
reviewing and analyzing the proposed exhibits received from the defendant; 
reviewing and analyzing his Answers to plaintiff's Interrogatories and 
Response to our Request for Production and cross-checking with documents and 
allegations made elsewhere in his dossier; reviewing and analyzing a long 
letter and compilation mailed by defendant to plaintiff's parents and sisters 
concerning her abortion and alleged boyfriends, 8.5 hours. (Note that almost 
all of this material was hand written.) 
(e) Answering and responding to the defendant's final Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production, 1.0 hr. 
(f) Conputing child support and drafting proposal for distribution of 
property and for payment of alimony and child support, 1.5 hours. 
(g) Preparing the initial outline for examination of the defendant and 
the plaintiff, 3.25 hours. 
23. After commencement of the trial, until the end of the month, 
January, 45.5 hours in legal services were provided to the plaintiff, 
including: 
(a) The first day of trial, January 12th, including preparation before 
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the trial and review and preparation of summation of the testimony following 
the afternoon recess, 11.0 hours. 
(b) The second day of trial, January 13th, 8.0 hours, plus a conference 
with Dr. Stewart following the afternoon recess, 0.5 hour. 
(c) The third day of trial, January 17th, 9.0 hours, including 
preparation and preparation of summation of testimony. 
(d) The fourth day of trial, January 14th, 4.5 hours. 
(e) On January 14th through 16th, telephone conferences with client, 
witness preparation, consultation with Dr. Stewart, research and review and 
prepartion of examination, 10.0 hours. 
(f) After the trial, various telephone calls with opposing counsel and 
with plaintiff concerning the visitation schedule and other matters, and 
drafting of plaintiff's proposal for visitation, 2.5 hours. 
24. During February, 1989, to the date of this Affidavit, the 
undersigned has provided 6.0 hours in legal services for further workon the 
visitation schedule and for preparation of a proposed distribution of 
household furniture and furnishings, including telephone calls with the 
plaintiff and with opposing counsel, legal research and preparation of final 
argument. 
24. The services provided to the plaintiff by her attorney have been 
necessary to protect her interests and the charges for these services are 
reasonable. However, it is estimated that the cost of her representation is 
double that which it would have been, had the defendant been willing to 
negotiate, and had he taken a more reasonable position regarding the issues in 
dispute. 
-7- A -Z(* 
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DATED this (Q ^ day of February, 1989. 
JUDITH ROMNEY ^WOLBACH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SIGNED AND SWORN to before me tftJsHLg day of February, 1989. 
NOTARY PUBLI^, Tesidin^ in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On the 7th day of February, 1989, I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Affidavit to counsel for the defendant, Lynn J Clark, at the Courts 
Building, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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Plaintiff's Costs of Court and Expenses 
1. Services of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart $1/128.00 
2. Witness fees 41.40 
3c Constable 24.00 
4. Copies and postage 150.65 
5. Copy of Dr. Cline's video 25.00 
6. Runner 10.00 
TOTAL: $1,379.05 
A-Z2 
LYNN J CLARK #4013 
Attorney for Defendant 
948 E. North Union Avenue 
Suite C-7IO5 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 25 5-760 0 
»no a JUUICJ<S! O{strict 
A W t 8 1989 
t-^puty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH A. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON, 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION 
OF MINUTE ENTRY, OBJECTIONS 
TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CON-
CLUSION AND DECREE AND 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER JUDG-
MENT AS SET FORTH IN THE 
COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY. 
Civil No. D-88-;642 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant David Wi l son , by and th rough h i s A t t o r n e y , 
Lynn J C l a r k , r e s p e c t f u l l y moves t h i s C o u r t f o r t h e 
f o l l o w i n g r e l i e f : 
1 . To c l a r i f y t h i s C o u r t ' s w r i t t e n Memorandum 
D e c i s i o n da t ed March 6, 1989. 
2 . To Objec t to p o r t i o n s of P l a i n t i f f ' s proposed 
F i n d i n g s of F a c t , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and D e c r e e of 
Divorce and 
3 . To r e q u e s t t h a t t h i s Cour t r e c o n s i d e r p o r t i o n s 
of i t s Memorandum D e c i s i o n . 
A-z? 
PART I 
Clarification of Memorandum Decision 
Several inconsistencies between what is contained in 
the Court's Memorandum Decision and what was communicated 
to counsel by telephone have led to questions concerning 
the final order. Additionally, there are issues 
pertinent to the final judgement that are not addressed 
by the Memorandum Decision. Those issues need to be 
addressed. 
1. Paragraph Six (6) on page Five (5) of the decision is 
so worded as to allow Defendant only Christmas eve 
and Christmas morning with his children on 
alternating years. Defendant believes that he should 
be granted at least one half (1/2) of the children's 
school vacation period each year in addition to the 
Christmas eve/Christmas day visitation as provided. 
2. Paragraph Seven (7), One-jThree (1-3) on page Eight 
(8) of the Decision provides for grandparent 
visitation. It does not provide for visitation with 
the children by the paternal grandparents during 
visits they may make to Utah during other times of 
the year. While they could certainly visit with the 
children during Defendant's scheduled visitation 
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periods, it is possible that their visit may not 
coincide with Defendant's schedule. Defendant prays 
that the paternal grandparents be allowed the right 
to visit with the children for a reasonable time on 
those occasions when they are in Utah. 
Paragraph One (1) on page Seven (7) awards the 
parties home to Plaintiff and purports to equally 
divide the equity therein between the parties. 
However, there is no mention of or consideration of 
the Seven Thousand dollar ($7,000.00) loan from 
Defendant's father used by the parties to purchase 
the home. Likewise, there is no mention of the loan 
in the Court's findings. If, in fact, Defendant's 
father is to be denied that loan or if it is the 
Court's intention to make Defendant's portion of the 
equity subject to that loan, sufficient findings and 
conclusions and a final judgement should be rendered 
on that issue. 
Paragraph Two (2) of page Seven (7) purports to award 
one half (1/2) of both Defendants IRA account and his 
Ready Asset account to Plaintiff. The uncontroverted 
testimony at trial was that these funds belonged to 
Defendant prior to the marriage and had never been 
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commingled. There are no findings by the Court 
concerning the ownership of these funds. There was 
no evidence at the trial concerning Plaintiff's need 
for them. Given that there was no finding that 
Plaintiff either owned any interest in those funds 
nor that she demonstrated an actual future need for 
those funds, Defendant believes that findings of fact 
should be entered justifying the current award. 
In documents filed with the Court, Plaintiff was 
shown to have received approximately Eight Thousand, 
Five Hundred dollars ($8,500.00) in jewelry and other 
items as an inheritance. The Court was asked to 
determine whether or not that property should be 
divided between the parties as was Defendants 
inheritance used to purchase the parties home. Again 
no findings were included in the Memorandum Decision 
on this issue. 
Paragraph One (1) on page Seven (7) dealing with the 
Blazer awards Plaintiff Sixty-Five percent (65%) of 
the acknowledged value of that vehicle at the time of 
the trial. there was no finding of fact concerning 
the net value of the vehicle or of Defendant's 
ability to pay this amount. Some guidance on the 
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basis of this award should be given, especially in as 
much as the funds used to purchase the vehicle were a 
gift to Defendant from his father. 
Child support, on page Eight (8) , was decreed to be 
awarded on the basis of the Child Support Guide 
Lines. Notwithstanding the fact that the previous 
guidelines have been repealed by the legislature, 
there is a discrepancy between the worksheets 
provided by Plaintiff and the worksheet provided by 
Defendant. 
Defendant's worksheet is attached hereto and is based 
upon his actual job related income. Defendant is not 
employed by his father's corporation and has no 
contractual right to receive a director's fee in the 
future. Further, even if this income is available in 
the future, Defendant does not now have those funds 
and cannot therefore use them as a means of satisfying 
a current child support obligation. Should the funds 
be considered, they should be considered in light of 
their real nature, that of a gift to him. 
Alternatively, those funds have an associated tax 
consequence to Defendant which reduces the actual 
amount available to him. 
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Day care expenses are not covered in the Decision 
either in the findings of fact nor in the award 
portion. Because neither of these parties have the 
financial ability to keep their children enrolled in 
the Montessori school system, and since one of the 
children should be attending public school on a full-
time basis and a second kindergarten age child could 
be attending public school on a one half (1/2) time 
basis, any award of child support should be 
calculated for only that time the children could not 
be in public schools and at a rate that could be 
obtained by a private baby sitter in the children's 
neighborhood. Further, consideration should be given 
to the fact that Defendant could watch the children 
virtually every day and that such supervision would 
not only lower the day care expense, but would 
benefit the children by spending that time with their 
father. 
The Court has awarded Plaintiff alimony in the amount 
of Two Hundred Fifty dollars ($250.00) per month 
without having made a finding that she requires that 
income, or that she is entitled to such a lifetime 
award of that income after a Six (6) year marriage to 
6 
Defendant or that Defendant has the financial ability 
to pay such sum. Findings based on the evidence 
aduced at trial should be made to support such a 
judgement or the judgement should be modified. 
10. The Court has made no finding with respect to whether 
or not the Attorney's fees claimed by Plaintiff have 
or have not already been paid. No finding has been 
made as to the reasonableness of the fees claimed, 
nor has there been a finding made which establishes 
that Defendant cannot even pay his own Attorney's 
fees. Given that the parties parents have paid for 
their fees and that Defendant's parents have also 
paid for an extremely expensive report prepared by 
Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and a report prepared by Dr. 
Cline, some basis for such an award of fees to one 
party by the other party who is incapable of paying 
additional fees should be supported. 
PART ri 
Objection to Plaintifff s Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
P l a i n t i f f , in p r e p a r i n g her F i n d i n g s of F a c t , 
C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and Decree of Divorce has made 
numerous statements which are e i ther not consistent with 
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t h e C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s o r wh ich a r e e i t h e r u n r e a s o n a b l e 
e x t e n s i o n s of t h e C o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t s o r a r e e n t i r e l y 
unsuppor ted by t h e C o u r t ' s Memorandum. 
1 . Pa ragraph Three (3) of P l a i n t i f f ' s f i n d i n g s go f a r 
b e y o n d a n y p r o n o u n c e m e n t of t h i s C o u r t . T h a t 
p a r a g r a p h , w h i l e c o n t a i n i n g some t r u t h , p a i n t s 
Defendant w i th a wide b r u s h , a t t e m p t i n g to p o r t r a y 
him as t h e s o l e s o u r c e of c o n t e n t i o n in t h e m a r r i a g e . 
T r i a l t e s t i m o n y was t h a t Defendant had not changed 
d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e , b u t t h a t P l a i n t i f f had s imply 
changed her mind abou t what she wanted and t h a t what 
s h e w a n t e d was no l o n g e r t h e d e f e n d a n t . T r i a l 
t e s t i m o n y was a l s o t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t P l a i n t i f f 
provoked Defendant i n t o t h e Two (2) minor p h y s i c a l 
c o n f l i c t s t h a t were t e s t i f i e d t o . The Cour t in f a c t 
found t h a t bo th p a r t i e s had grounds fo r d i v o r c e . 
2. Pa ragraph Nine (9) of P l a i n t i f f ' s f i n d i n g i s t aken 
from t h e C o u r t ' s Memorandum D e c i s i o n , b u t i n f a c t 
t h e r e was l i t t l e i f any t e s t i m o n y a t a l l on t h a t 
s u b j e c t . Dr S t e w a r t ' s t e s t i m o n y was t h a t P l a i n t i f f 
was not a b l e to c o n t r o l or d i s c i p l i n e t h e c h i l d r e n 
e f f e c t i v e l y . . 
3 . Pa ragraph Nine (9) "L" r e c i t e s a n o t h e r f i n d i n g by the 
8 
Court which states that Defendant's belief about a 
wife's role be submissive and passive. There was no 
evidence from Defendant on this point at all. 
Defendant does not have such a belief as it is stated 
in the Memorandum. 
4. Paragraph Nine (9) "0" states that Plaintiff upgraded 
her parenting skills. Since Doctor Stewart did not 
see or meet with Plaintiff after her parenting class, 
she could not know if Plaintiff attended the class or 
if her attendance had improved her weak parenting 
skills. 
5. Paragraph Eleven (11) "F" of the proposed findings is 
believed to be incorrect in that it would limit 
Defendant's Christmas visitation to about Thirty-Six 
(36) hours every other year. 
6. Defendant believes that the paternal grandparents 
should also have the right to reasonable visitation 
with the children during times when the grandparents 
might be visiting in Utah. 
7. Paragraph Sixteen (16) does not follow the Court's 
Memorandum decision at all as no such figures are 
included. While the defendant's prison and school 
income are the subject of contracts, the director's 
9 
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fee i s n o t and t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t i t w i l l 
c o n t i n u e . t h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y no b a s i s f o r i n c l u d i n g 
an i m a g i n a r y summer income of Two Thousand d o l l a r s 
($2 ,000 .00 ) in D e f e n d a n t ' s income and t h a t s t a t e m e n t 
s h o u l d be s t r i c k e n . P l a i n t i f f ' s i ncome from h i s 
s c h o o l j o b a n d p r i s o n j o b i s t h e o n l y i n c o m e 
a v a i l a b l e t o be c o n s i d e r e d a s a b a s i s f o r t h e 
c o m p u t a t i o n of c h i l d s u p p o r t a n d / o r o t h e r awards . 
8. P a r a g r a p h Seven teen (17) i s a l s o an i n c l u s i o n by 
P l a i n t i f f ' s A t t o r n e y t h a t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e 
C o u r t ' s Memorandum d e c i s i o n . P l a i n t i f f r e f u s e d for 
a l m o s t a y e a r t o even look f o r a m e a n i n g f u l j o b , 
p r e f e r r i n g t o l i v e on s u p p o r t pa id by Defendan t . The 
Cour t no t ed t h a t she i s a c o l l e g e e d u c a t e d pe r son who 
i s c a p a b l e of much more than she i s d o i n g . 
9 . Pa r ag raph E i g h t e e n (18) i s f u r t h e r n o t founded in any 
f i n d i n g made by the C o u r t . 
10 . P a r a g r a p h Twenty (20) a s s u m e s an income l e v e l f o r 
Defendant which i s no t c o r r e c t . 
1 1 . P a r a g r a p h Twenty-One (21) of P l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p o s e d 
f i n d i n g s i s a g a i n b a s e d on P l a i n t i f f ' s A t t o r n e y ' s 
dreams and no t on e i t h e r t h e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n nor on 
r e a l i t y . These p a r t i e s canno t s u p p o r t two homes and 
p l a c e t h e i r c h i l d r e n i n t h e M o n t e s s o r i s c h o o l . 
F u r t h e r Two (2) of t h e c h i l d r e n cou ld be a t t e n d i n g 
10 
4-32 
f r e e p u b l i c s c h o o l . Any award of funds fo r day c a r e 
shou ld be based on t h e r e a s o n a b l e c o s t of day c a r e 
c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t Two (2) of t h e c h i l d r e n c o u l d o r 
s h o u l d b e i n p u b l i c s h c o o l e a c h d a y . S i n c e 
D e f e n d a n t ' s work s c h e d u l e would a l l o w him to tend t h e 
c h i l d r e n v i r t u a l l y e v e r y w o r k i n g d a y , t h a t f a c t 
shou ld a l s o s e r v e t o modify any such award . 
12 . T h e r e i s no b a s i s f o r t h e f i n d i n g P l a i n t i f f h a s 
i n c l u d e d in Paragraph Twenty-Two (22) of he r F i n d i n g s 
of F a c t . 
13 . P a r a g r a p h Twenty-jThree (23) of P l a i n t i f f ' s proposed 
f i n d i n g s bea r no r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s 
and do n o t c o m p o r t w i t h s t a t e law i n t h a t e i t h e r 
p a r t y can on ly be o r d e r e d to o b t a i n such i n s u r a n c e i f 
i t i s a v a i l a b l e to them through t h e i r employment a t a 
r e a s o n a b l e c o s t . 
14. P a r a g r a p h T w e n t y - j F o u r (24) i s n o t b a s e d on t h e 
C o u r t ' s Memorandum d e c i s i o n . 
15 . There a r e a b s o l u t e l y no f i n d i n g s t h a t would s u p p o r t 
t h e l anguage found in Pa ragraph Twenty-Five (25) of 
P l a i n t i f f ' s , proposed f i n d i n g s . In f a c t , i f one were 
t o add t o g e t h e r t h e amoun t s P l a i n t i f f s u g g e s t s a s 
c h i l d s u p p o r t , F o u r H u n d r e d and N i n e d o l l a r s 
( $ 4 0 9 . 0 0 ) , day c a r e , Two h u n d r e d and One d o l l a r s 
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($201o00) and alimony, Two Hundred Fifty dollars 
($250.00), the total becomes Eight Hundred Sixty 
dollars ($860.00) per month. Defendants total 
monthly take home pay is approximately One Thousand, 
Three Hundred Thirty-jNine dollars ($1,339.00) per 
month. the proposed awards equal Sixty-;Four percent 
(64%) of Defendants disposable income, an amount 
which cannot even be legally collected by way of wage 
garnishment. Assuming that such an amount were to be 
paid, Plaintiff would enjoy a monthly income of One 
Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty dollars ($1,820.00), an 
increase from the total family income prior to the 
marriage of some Four Hundred Eighty-One dollars 
($481.00) per month or Thirty-;Six percent (36%) 
increase. Defendant cannot possibly provide a home 
for himself and for his children for approximately 
one half (1/2) of each year, provide transportation, 
food, clothing, insurance or other necessities. 
There is no Court finding that she is entitled to 
life long alimony after a Six (6) year marriage, 
especially given her age and education. 
Plaintiff lists marital assets as including numerous 
items. The Court has not made such a list included 
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as its findings. Particularly, the 1979 pickup truck 
which has belonged solely to Defendant since Four (4) 
years prior to the marriage. 
Sub Paragraph (e) of paragraph Twenty-Eight (28) is 
also contrary to the facts and is not supported by 
findings established by the Court. the Court did not 
find that either the Merrill Lynch IRA account or the 
Ready Asset account were marital property. The 
uncontroverted trial testimony was that the accounts 
were both owned by Defendant prior to the marriage, 
that Plaintiff has never had an interest in either 
account, has never deposited her funds in either 
account and that the funds have not generally been 
used for marital debt. 
Paragraph Twenty-jNine (29) states that the loan of 
Seven Thousand dollars ($7,000.00) was made only to 
Defendant. The Court made no finding on this issue. 
The uncontested testimony at trial by Defendant's 
father was that it was a loan to both Plaintiff and 
Defendant and that both were aware it was a loan and 
both agreed to repay it. 
No finding by the Court was entered as to the loans 
collectability as that question was not at issue 
before this Court. 
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Parag raph Th i r ty - ( Three (33) i s in e r r o r in s e v e r a l 
r e s p e c t s a n d i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e C o u r t ' s 
Memorandum d e c i s i o n . 
The p a r t i e s t r a d e d in a c a r , not a t r u c k as s t a t e d . 
The c a r used as a p a r t of t h e down payment was a g i f t 
t o Defendant by h i s f a t h e r . 
The Ready Asse t a c c o u n t from which Defendant wi thdrew 
a b o u t One T h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ( $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) was n o t 
" t h e i r " a c c o u n t , b u t r a t h e r be longed t o Defendan t . 
Pa rag raph T h i r t y - F i v e (35) of P l a i n t i f f ' s proposed 
f i n d i n g s i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by the C o u r t ' s Memorandum 
d e c i s i o n . The t r u c k has been D e f e n d a n t ' s s e p a r a t e 
p r o p e r t y s i n c e he p u r c h a s e d i t a p p r o x i m a t e l y Four (4) 
y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e . F u r t h e r , t h e r e i s no 
o r d e r in t he C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n r e q u i r i n g Defendant t o 
r e p u r c h a s e h i s v e h i c l e from P l a i n t i f f . 
Pa rag raph T h i r t y - S i x (36) i s a l s o f a c t u a l l y i n c o r r e c t 
and i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s . 
D e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e d r e a l p r o p e r t y from h i s p a r e n t s 
s e v e r a l y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e . The p r o p e r t y 
was s o l d s h o r t l y p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e and the funds 
d e p o s i t e d t o an a c c o u n t owned s o l e l y , even today by 
Defendan t . 
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1. Paragraph Thirty-?Seven (37) of the proposed findings 
are also factually incorrect and are not supported by 
the Court's findings. Both parties, not just the 
Defendant paid tithing of Five Thousand dollars 
($5,000.00). The innuendo concerning the "prior gift" 
to Defendant, inferring that it was also a wedding 
gift is incorrect as it was given to Defendant prior 
to the time he ever met Plaintiff. The remainder of 
the funds, some Three Thousand dollars ($3,000.00) 
were spent on family expenses. There was no court 
finding that the funds were ever commingled. Even if 
they were, the extent of any possible commingling 
would be Three Thousand dollars ($3,000.00). 
2. Paragraph Th ir ty-;E igh t (38) is both factually 
incorrect and is not supported by the Court's 
findings. The IRA account was not the "Parties" IRA 
account. It belonged solely to Defendant and was 
funded with monies that belonged to Defendant years 
prior to the conception of the marriage. Only a 
small portion of the funds in that account were 
expended on family obligations. The amount withdrawn 
being equal to the remainder of the gift to the 
parties by Defendant's parents. 
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39, Again Paragraph Thirty-^Nine (39) is factually 
inadequate and not supported. The IRA account is a 
mutual fund stock account and its value varies as 
does the stock market. No current figures were 
presented to the Court concerning the value of that 
account at the trial. The value set forth on the 
Ready Asset account is an amount imagined or supposed 
to be correct by Plaintiff's counsel and again bears 
no factual relationship to the actual balance of that 
account. 
40c The Court did not find that either or both of these 
accounts were marital assets, only that Plaintiff 
should be paid one half (1/2) of those accounts. The 
Court placed no value on those interests as that 
information was and currently is unavailable to the 
Court. 
Defendant further objects to the Plaintifff s proposed 
conclusions of law as set forth below; 
1. In Paragraph Two (2), Plaintiff's reference to the 
grounds for divorce is in error. The Court made no 
finding in its Memorandum decision concerning the 
grounds for divorce and Defendant believes that the 
same should be listed as irreconcilable differences. 
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I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e d i v o r c e r e s u l t e d f r o m 
P l a i n t i f f ' s e m e r g i n g m a t u r i t y and d e s i r e t o s e e k 
o t h e r compan ionsh ip . A c o n c l u s i o n of men ta l c r u e l t y 
i s bo th i n a c c u r a t e and a n e e d l e s s d i s s e r v i c e to t he 
Defendan t . 
Pa rag raph Six (6) i s made o u t s i d e of t h e scope of t h e 
C o u r t ' s Memorandum d e c i s i o n . F u r t h e r , i f P l a i n t i f f 
i n t e n d s t o i n c l u d e t h e s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y owned by 
D e f e n d a n t , i . e . , h i s IRA a c c o u n t , h i s Ready A s s e t 
a c c o u n t and h i s 1979 p i c k u p t r u c k , t h o s e i t e m s 
c l e a r l y be longed t o him y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e . 
Pa rag raph Seven (7) of t h e c o n c l u s i o n s a r e o b j e c t e d 
t o a s n o t b e i n g s u p p o r t e d by t h e f i n d i n g s , and o r 
s u p p o r t e d by f i n d i n g s and f i g u r e s a s i m a g i n e d by 
P l a i n t i f f s c o u n s e l . 
P a r a g r a p h E i g h t ( 8 ) o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n s i s 
i n s u p p o r t a b l e . The c o l l e c t a b i l i t y of t h e Seven 
Thousand d o l l a r s ( $ 7 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) was n o t b e f o r e t h e 
C o u r t . F u r t h e r t h i s i s a Court of e q u i t y , which can 
s u r e l y r e c o g n i z e t h a t P l a i n t i f f a c c e p t e d t he loan and 
t h a t i t was made i n good f a i t h . On t h e b a s i s of 
Quantum M e r i t , t h e C o u r t c o u l d h a v e s e p a r a t e d t h e 
loan ou t of t h e a p p a r e n t e q u i t y in t h e home, awarded 
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that additional equity to Defendant and ordered him 
to assume that debt. It would certainly not be 
inequitable for Plaintiff's equity to be offset by a 
loan she accepted. To allow her to retain the 
benefits of that loan is to allow her to enjoy the 
benefits of an unjust enrichment at the expense of 
her father-in-law. 
Defendant Objects to Plaintifff s Proposed 
Decree of Divorce as Follows: 
lc Paragraph Three (3) "f" concerning the Christmas 
visitation period for the reasons stated above. 
2. Paragraph Six (6) relating to grandparent visitations 
for the reasons stated above. 
3. Paragraphs Eight (8) and Nine (9) as they do not 
comply with the Court's order. 
4. Paragraph Ten (10) because it does not comply with 
state law governing the obligation to obtain health 
and accident insurance for the children. 
5. Paragraph Eleven (11) because it is uncollectable 
under state law. 
6. Paragraph Seventeen (17) as it does not follow the 
written Memorandum decision of the Court. 
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7c Paragraphs Eighteen (18) and Nineteen (19) as they 
are not factually correct and do not reflect the 
written order of the Court in this matter. 
PAIjT III 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement 
This motion is brought pursuant to Rule Fifty-jNine 
(59) "e" of the .Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendant respectfully moves this Court to reconsider 
its judgement in this matter for the following reasons: 
1. Plaintiff is not the most fit parent to have 
custody of the children. 
2. The award of child support, day care expenses and 
alimony are excessive and not collectible under current 
state law. Further, should such an order continue, it 
would force Defendant onto the state welfare rolls 
in spite of his working more than 47 hours each week. 
3. The award of virtually all of Defendants separate 
property to Plaintiff is patently unfair to both 
Defendant and to his children. 
Point One 
Plaintiff offered virtually no testimony from any 
creditable source to bolster her claim as a fit parent. 
19 
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The t e s t i m o n y of Dr. S t e w a r t was t h a t she had never been 
i n P l a i n t i f f ' s home, had n e v e r met o r known P l a i n t i f f 
o u t s i d e of he r o f f i c e and t h o s e m e e t i n g s t o t a l e d fewer 
t h a n Ten (10) h o u r s , d u r i n g wh ich t i m e P l a i n t i f f was 
s p e n d i n g s e v e r a l h o u r s t a k i n g t h e MMPI T e s t . D r . 
S t e w a r t ' s r e p o r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t P l a i n t i f f was n o t 
e f f e c t i v e a t d e a l i n g wi th t h e c h i l d r e n and t h a t Defendant 
had b e t t e r p a r e n t i n g s k i l l s . P l a i n t i f f ' s s k i l l s were so 
p o o r t h a t D r . S t e w a r t r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t s h e t a k e a 
p a r e n t i n g c l a s s . 
A l l o r v i r t u a l l y a l l of t h e p a r t y ' s f r i e n d s and 
a c q u a i n t a n c e s appeared in Cour t and t e s t i f i e d conce rn ing 
t h e c a r e t hey observed t h e c h i l d r e n to r e c e i v e from both 
p a r e n t s . 
Each of t h e w i t n e s s e s who t e s t i f i e d t o l d the Cour t 
t h a t i n e v e r y a r e a of p a r e n t i n g s k i l l s , P l a i n t i f f was 
e i t h e r b e l o w a v e r a g e o r s e v e r e l y r e m i s s . Of m o s t 
c o n c e r n , even t o Dr. S t e w a r t , was a Mother who d id not 
hug, k i s s or o t h e r w i s e show a f f e c t i o n fo r her c h i l d r e n . 
E v e r y w i t n e s s who t e s t i f i e d , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e t h i n g 
they n o t i c e d most abou t E l i z a b e t h was t h a t she d id no t 
show a f f e c t i o n t o t h e c h i l d r e n . No one remembered her 
ever p l a y i n g wi th the c h i l d r e n or spend ing t ime t e a c h i n g 
them. 
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In s p i t e of the C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t Defendant sha red 
i n t h e blame fo r t h e poor manner in which t h e c h i l d r e n 
were f e d , c l o t h e d and s u p e r v i s e d , t e s t i m o n y was t h a t such 
p r a c t i c e c o n t i n u e d when P l a i n t i f f was s o l e l y in charge of 
t he c h i l d r e n . The n e i g h b o r s t e s t i f i e d t h e c h i l d r e n were 
o f t e n o u t s i d e from 7:30 a .m. t o as l a t e as 10:00 to 10:30 
p.m. w i t h o u t a p p a r e n t s u p e r v i s i o n . They t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
t h e c h i l d r e n , w h i l e i n P l a i n t i f f ' s c a r e , w e r e 
u n s u p e r v i s e d whi le ne ighborhood f i r e w o r k s were be ing s e t 
o f f . T h e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y o b s e r v e d P l a i n t i f f 
s c o l d i n g Rachel when she f e l l from a t r u c k in the s t r e e t 
a n d t h a t P l a i n t i f f o f f e r e d no e m o t i o n a l s u p p o r t o r 
comfo r t . They a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t he c h i l d r e n ' s a t t i r e 
was no t m a t c h i n g , d i d n ' t look n e a t and was o f t e n d i r t y . 
Th i s i s no t a mother who has p r o p e r p a r e n t i n g s k i l l s . 
Each of F ive (5) w i t n e s s e s who were i n t i m a t e f r i e n d s 
of t h e p a r t i e s , who s p e n t much t ime in t h e Wilson home, 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was t h e D e f e n d a n t who showed t h e 
c h i l d r e n love and c o n c e r n . I t was t h e i r uncompromising 
t e s t i m o n y t h a t he was t h e r e f o r t h e c h i l d r e n w h i l e 
P l a i n t i f f was n o t . Those who have had c o n t a c t with David 
s i n c e t h e p a r t i e s s e p a r a t i o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t he took g r e a t 
c a r e in b a t h i n g and keeping t h e c h i l d r e n c l e a n and n e a t . 
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They testified that he prepared well balanced meals for 
them. That he played with them and educated them. 
Mostly, and most importantly, he showers them with love. 
Dr. Victor Cline, an extremely prominent local teacher 
and Psychologist visited with David and with the children 
not only in his office, but in the Wilson home. Although 
he found both of the parties to have some minor flaws, he 
found and so stated in his report, that David was the 
most committed father he had ever met. 
To align David's record of love, care and attention 
to the children alongside of Elizbethfs unloving, lack of 
concern for the children should leave the court a very 
clear choice that he is by far the better parent. 
Point Two 
The Court has awarded child support, day care 
expenses and alimony to Plaintiff. The amounts of the 
child care expenses were not established by the Court, 
but taking Plaintiff fs made-;up figures of Four Hundred 
and Nine dollars ($409.00) for child support, Two hundred 
and one dollars ($201.00) for day care and Two Hundred 
and Fifty dollars ($250.00) for alimony, the total 
monthly award is Eight Hundred and Sixty dollars 
($860.00) per month. Considering that Defendant's 
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disposable income totals only One Thousand Three Hundred 
Thirty-Nine dollars ($1,339.00), were Defendant to pay 
Plaintiff Eight Hundred and Sixty dollars ($860.00) each 
month, he would be left with Four Hundred Seventy-Nine 
dollars ($479.00) per month. Given that he also has been 
ordered to assume the Blazer payment of One Hundred 
dollars ($100.00) per month, he is left with Three 
Hundred Seventy-jNine dollars ($379.00) per month to 
provide food, shelter, clothing, insurance, 
transportation and miscellaneous items not only for 
himself, but since he has been awarded the care of the 
children for approximately One Hundred Forty (140) to One 
Hundred Fifty (150) days each year, he must also provide 
for them. Such a result is grossly unfair, particularly 
in light of the fact that such an award will leave 
Plaintiff with almost One Thousand Eight Hundred dollars 
($1,800.00) per month as available income. That amount 
far exceeds the old family units income with one less 
member. Such an income to her will not allow her to 
continue the life style she was used to after Five (5) 
years of marriage, but will significantly improve it 
while making it impossible for Defendant to survive. 
Such a result has never been the law in the state. 
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The amount claimed by Plaintiff's interpretation of 
the Court's order, i.e., Eight Hundred Sixty dollars 
($860.00) is uncollectable under both state and federal 
law. such an amount is equal to approximately Sixty-Five 
percent (65%) of Defendants net disposable income. 
Section 62A-;ll-406 of the Utah code requires the 
compliance of Fifteen (15) U.S.C., Section 1673(b). That 
Federal law limits garnishment for purposes of child 
support and alimony to a maximum of Fifty (50%) of the 
Defendant's income. Therefore, should Defendant be 
either unwilling or in this case unable to pay the amount 
proposed by Plaintiff, that amount would be uncollectable 
under both State and Federal law. 
Reliance on the currently established child support 
guidelines is also improper given the current level of 
visitation granted to Defendant. Paragraph Ten (10) of 
the "Overview" of those guidelines specifies that those 
guidelines should not apply in cases where one parent has 
the children more than Thirty-Five percent (35%) of the 
time. A calculation based on the requirements of this 
section would place the award of child support for 
Defendant at Three Hundred Ten dollars ($310.00) per 
month for the three children. 
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J-sz 
While day care in the Montessori school system for 
all three of the Wilson children may be desirable, it is 
clear that it is a luxury that this family cannot afford. 
They now have a combined gross family income of 
approximately Two Thousand Six Hundred dollars 
($2.600.00) per month before taxes and approximately Two 
Thousand Two Hundred dollars ($2,200.00) per month after 
taxes. Divide this between households and they are each 
going to have some difficulty providing necessities. Any 
day care considered for the children should be based on 
the older two children being in public school and the 
youngest being watched by a neighbor at a reasonable 
rate. Further consideration should be given to the fact 
that Defendant's work schedule would allow him to care 
for his own children during much of the daytime hours. 
Point Three 
The Court has awarded one half (1/2) of Defendant's 
IRA account and one half (1/2) of Defendant's Ready Asset 
account to Plaintiff together with the home, Sixty-Five 
percent (65%) of the equity in a Blazer automobile and 
Five Thousand dollars ($5,000.00) in Attorney's fees. 
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4-$3 
R e v i e w i n g t h e t o t a l a s s e t s a v a i l a b l e t o D e f e n d a n t , we 
f i n d t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
Home $ 2 7 , 8 0 0 * A p p r o x i m a t e Amounts 
B l a z e r 1 0 , 0 0 0 
IRA 1 4 , 0 0 0 * 
Ready A s s e t 2 , 0 0 0 * 
$ 5 3 , 8 0 0 
C a s h A s s e t s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e D e f e n d a n t e q u a l 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y S i x t e e n T h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ( $ 1 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) . As 
t h e O r d e r a p p e a r s a t t h i s t i m e , D e f e n d a n t i s o r d e r e d t o 
pay t o P l a i n t i f f t h e f o l l o w i n g a m o u n t s : 
1/2 of t h e IRA $ 1 , 0 0 0 
1/2 of t h e Ready A s s e t a c c o u n t 7 , 0 0 0 
65% of t h e B l a z e r ' s v a l u e 6 , 5 0 0 
A t t o r n e y ' s F e e s 5 , 0 0 0 
T o t a l Award t o P l a i n t i f f $ 1 9 , 5 0 0 
G i v e n t h a t D e f e n d a n t o n l y h a s a v a i l a b l e t o h i m 
S i x t e e n T h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ( $ 1 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) , t h e C o u r t h a s 
awarded t o P l a i n t i f f a l l o f D e f e n d a n t ' s c a s h a s s e t s and 
a n a d d i t i o n a l T h r e e T h o u s a n d F i v e H u n d r e d d o l l a r s 
( $ 3 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 ) w h i c h D e f e n d a n t d o e s n o t e v e n p o s s e s s . 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e C o u r t h a s l e f t t o D e f e n d a n t t h e S e v e n 
T h o u s a n d d o l l a r ( $ 7 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) l o a n owing t o h i s p a r e n t s . 
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e a b o v e a w a r d , t h e C o u r t h a s t a k e n 
S i x t y - ^ F i v e p e r c e n t (65%) of D e f e n d a n t s f u t u r e e a r n i n g s 
w h i c h wou ld p r e c l u d e D e f e n d a n t from e v e r b e i n g a b l e t o 
s a t i s f y t h i s j u d g e m e n t and f o r c e him i n t o p o v e r t y . 
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4-s<fi 
Defendant prays that the Court will reconsider its 
current Memorandum decision in light of the above facts. 
Consideration should also be given to the short-term 
nature of the marriage, the wife's college education and 
the fact that she simply grew tired of the marriage she 
had originally desired. 
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DART, ADAMSON & KASTING . _^M J^U*?*-
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310 South Main, Suite 1330 :f — , ~7^:U 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ELIZABETH A. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY 
PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE JUDGMENT 
PENDING APPEAL 
Civil No. D-88-642 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
ooOoo 
COMES NOW, the defendant and Pursuant to Rule 62 (d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves the Court for an Order 
staying execution of any judgments in connection with the Decree 
of Divorce entered in the above-entitled matter on April 26, 1989, 
and more particularly, staying the requirements and payments 
imposed upon the defendant under paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 & 
23 of the Decree of Divorce. This motion is made for the reason 
that the defendant has appealed the Trial Court's decision as it 
relates to the support property and debt distribution and 
attorneys' fees awards to the Utah Court of Appeals and a final 
distribution of the assets in question would not be appropriate 
until the appeal in this matter has been concluded. A copy of the 
Notice of Appeal has been attached to this Motion and marked 
Exhibit "A." 
In support of this Request for Stay of Execution, the 
defendant proposes that he post as a supersedious bond a $15,000 
irrevocable letter of credit from First National Bank & Trust 
Company, a copy of which is attached to this Motion and marked 
Exhibit "B." Upon approval of the proposed bond, the defendant 
will deposit the original letter of credit with the Court to be 
held pending a decision by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant moves the Court for an Order staying 
execution of the judgments created under paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18 & 23 of the Decree of Divorce in this matter and that the Court 
approve the posting of the supersedious bond which has been 
proposed by the defendant to wit: a $15,000 irrevocable letter of 
credit from First National Bank & Trust Company, and that the 
plaintiff be ordered not to execute on any such judgments until the 
appellate process in this matter has been completed and for such 
other relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances. 
Dated: May ^Q_ 1989. 
DART, ADAM50N & KASTING 
/Kent M. Kas 
Attorneys for Defc 
A-$-(e 
TmVc? tJuZ'Ci&l District 
Q\ JUN 1 3 IP
01 
JUDITH RQMNEY WOLBACH (3534)
 3y 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-6222 
3y i ^ . . < y \ 
BY - _ U l < -
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH A. WILSON, 
Plaintiff, 
VSe 
DAVID RUSSELL WILSON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF PARTIAL SATISFACTION 
OF JUDGMENT & PROPERTY TRANSFER 
Civil No. D-88-642 
Judge John A. Rokich 
This is to certify that on May 12, 1989, the defendant took from the 
plaintiff's possession the 1987 Blazer which was awarded to him in the Decree 
of Divorce, and that on or about that date the defendant paid to the plaintiff 
the sum of $6,500.00, which was awarded to her in the Decree of Divorce for 
her interest in said vehicle. 
DATED: June 6, 1989. 
<N Jl, ,tii sa(/id>L 
JUDITH ROMNEY WOLBACH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SIGNED AND SWORN to before me on June , 1989. 
fcDTARY' PUBLIC /"residing in 
Salt Lake County S^ate of Utah. 
My conmission expires: 
A-S-l 
